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JESSICA LITMAN*

Copyright Legislation and
Technological Change
Mr. Huddleston. The gentleman realizes that this is a highly
technical subject and one that the ordinary Member is not qualified to deal with?
Mr. Bankhead. I understand that.
Mr. Huddleston. And that it is impossible to write a bill on this
subject on the floor of the House. It is impossible to do it with
any satisfaction.
Mr. Bankhead. In reply to that, permit me to state it is apparent
to me that it is impossible to write a bill in the committee.
Mr. Huddleston. Let us dismiss the subject, then.1

T

HIS is a story about private parties, vested interests, and the
inexorable pace of technological change. As of this writing,
there are nineteen copyright bills pending before Congress. The
number is typical. Throughout this century, members of Congress
have introduced innumerable copyright bills, held hearings on
many, reported some, and enacted few. In the past few years, Con*Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

B.A., 1974, Reed College;
M.F.A., 1976, Southern Methodist University; J.D., 1983, Columbia Law School. I
would like to thank Jonathan Weinberg, Bruce Frier, Jane Ginsburg, James Boyd
White, Jack Kernochan, Becky Eisenberg, Alex Aleinikoff, Pamela Samuelson, Avery
Katz, Joel Seligman, Fred Schauer, Don Herzog, Doug Kahn, Chris Whitman, Lee
Bollinger, Ralph Brown, William Pierce, and Harry Litman for their helpful comments
on earlier versions of this article.
1 75 CONG. REC. 11,072 (1932).
[275]
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gress has been inundated with proposals to revise copyright law in
light of new technology. 2 That, too, is typical.
Recent commentary reflects a dispute over whether the copyright
statute can adjust to the current climate of rapid technological
change. One camp argues that current technology differs profoundly from prior development and calls into question the assumptions on which our copyright laws are based.3 Another camp insists
that copyright law has always faced the problem of technological
change and accommodated it with remarkable success. The current
challenge, the argument continues, is not qualitatively different
from previous challenges, and the copyright statute is equal to the
task.4 Both camps rely heavily on received wisdom about the his2 See, e.g., Copyright Issues Presented by Digital Audio Tape: Joint Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Copyright and New Technologies: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1987); Home
Video Recording: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1987); Home Audio Recording Act: Hearings on S. 1739 before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1986); OTA Report on Intellectual Property
Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information: Joint Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Copyright and Technological Change: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See also Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground? 70
MINN. L. REV. 417, 424-30 (1985) (describing proposed copyright amendments preceding the enactment of sui generis protection for semiconductor chips); Olson, The Iron
Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the
1909 Act, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 109, 110-11, 125-30 (1989) (summarizing proposed
legislation).
3 See Kost, The End of Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN
ELECTRONIC AGE:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS NETWORK ADVI-

22-24, 1987, at 19 (Network Planning Paper No. 16,
1987) [hereinafter Network Planning Paper No. 16]; Fleischmann, The Impact of Digital Technology on Copyright Law, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5 (1988). See
generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (1986) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
4 See, e.g., Baumgarten & Meyer, Program Copyright and the Office of Technology
Assessment (pts. 1 & 2), 4 THE COMPUTER LAW. 8 (Oct. 1987), 1 (Nov. 1987); Marsh,
Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to Apply, 5 CARDOZO L.
REV. 635 (1984); Oman, The Copyright Law: Can it Wrap Itself Around the New Technologies? in Network Planning Paper No. 16, supra note 3, at 27; see also Davidson, The
Black Box Approach to Software Copyright Infringement, 3 THE COMPUTER LAW. 25,
27-28 (March 1986) (suggesting that copyright protection be extended to recombinant
DNA).
SORY COMM. MEETING, APRIL
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tory of the interaction between copyright and technology.5 Both,
therefore, proceed on the assumption that copyright law has been
effective, until now, in assimilating technological development; in
fact, it has not.
Throughout its history, copyright law has had difficulty accommodating technological change. Although the substance of copyright legislation in this century has evolved from meetings among
industry representatives whose avowed purpose was to draft legislation that provided for the future,6 the resulting statutes have done
so poorly. The language of copyright statutes has been phrased in
fact-specific language that has grown obsolete as new modes and
mediums of copyrightable expression have developed. Whatever
copyright statute has been on the books has been routinely, and justifiably, criticized as outmoded.7 In this Article, I suggest that the
nature of the legislative process we have relied on for copyright revision is largely to blame for those laws' deficiencies. 8
5See, e.g, Baumgarten & Meyer (pt. 2), supra note 4, at 2-7; Marsh, supra note 4, at
647.
6 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,

1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT

LAW REVISION PART 2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 29-

32 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter CLR PART 2] (colloquy); id. at 273-77 (written
remarks of Walter J. Derenberg, U.S. Copyright Soc'y); STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LIBRARIAN'S CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT, 1ST SESSION,

IN NEW YORK CITY, MAY 31-JUNE 2, 1905, at 45-48, reprintedin 1 E.F. BRYLAWSKI
& A. GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, at pt. C
(1976) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, 1ST SESS.] (colloquy).
7 See, e.g., Ebenstein, Introduction to S. ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT LAW: BASIC
AND RELATED MATERIALS, at xv-xx (1956); Solberg, Introduction to R.C. DEWOLF,
AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW at xix-xxiv (1925); Ashby, Legal Aspects of Radio
Broadcasting, 1 AIR L. REV. 331, 342 (1930); Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 503 (1945); Cramer, Some Observationson the Copyright

Law of 1976: Not Everything is Beautiful, 1 COMM./ENT. 157, 164-66 (1977); Fleischmann, supra note 3, at 24-26; Kupferman, Rights in New Media, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 172, 172 (1954); MacDonald, Technological Advances and Copyright, 8 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 3 (1960); Oman, Software as Seen by the U.S. Copyright Office, 28
IDEA 29 (1987); Stern, Reflections on Copyright Law, 21 N.Y.U. L.Q. 506, 512 (1947);
Toohey, The Only Copyright Law We Need, WILSON LIB. BULL., Sept., 1984, at 27. See
generally OTA Report, supra note 2.
8 There has been a bumper crop of recent literature propounding theoretical models
of the legislative process. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533 (1983); Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal
ProcessEra, 48 U. PIr. L. REV. 691 (1987); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Macey, Promoting
Public Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-33 (1986); Popkin, The Collaborative Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988); Posner, Economics, Politics,
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982);
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To solve the dilemma of updating and simplifying a body of law
too complicated for legislative revision,9 Congress and the Copyright Office have settled on a scheme for statutory drafting that features meetings and negotiations among representatives of industries
with interests in copyright. That scheme dominated copyright revision during the legislative process that led to the enactment of the
1909 Copyright Act.' ° Congress and the Copyright Office continued to rely on meetings and negotiations among interested parties
Mikva, Foreward to Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167
(1988).
Because this literature has focused on explicating the birth of a hypothetically typical
statute, it has paid little attention to the myriad processes accompanying the enactment
of actual statutes. Thus, while the models provide useful pedagogical tools for abstract
discussions of separation of powers, they tell us remarkably little about the legislative
process because they do not take as their task the examination of any actual legislative
processes. Rather, they replace the traditional fictions of legislative intent with alternative fictions that may challenge the mind but are no more descriptive of any actual
process culminating in legislation than the fictions they seek to displace. Until recently,
the debate omitted any empirical examination of how particular statutes came to be the
law. For an articulate critique of the empirical bases of the public choice literature, see
Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoreticaland "Empirical"
Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
In my examination of the legislative process that has yielded copyright statutes, I
shunt most of these models aside. Instead of addressing the theoretical legislative process literature directly, I describe an actual legislative process that does not fit neatly
into any of the propounded models.
9 It has been a commonplace among representatives of interests affected by copyright
that the subject is so complicated most members of Congress cannot understand it. See,
e.g., COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, 1ST SESS., supra note 6, at 145 (remarks of Herbert
Putnam, Librarian of Congress); CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 5 (remarks of Abraham
Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
There seems to be no reason why copyright law should necessarily be too complicated
for members of Congress to draft. Congress has, after all, frequently addressed its attention to matters, such as the tax code, that are at least as complex. Copyright legislation, however, has never been accorded the congressional staff or resources available for
legislation on politically sensitive issues like tax or military appropriations. It may be
that the impression that members of Congress cannot or will not spare copyright sufficient time to gain a thorough understanding has been a self-fulfilling one.
10 Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter 1909 Act],
repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). See, e.g., Revision of Copyright
Laws. HearingsBefore the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 365-69 (1908),
reprinted in 5 E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. K [hereinafter
1908 Hearings]; Copyright Hearings: Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the
Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-29, 31-33, 58-60, 68-70, 77-78, 88-90,
97, 154-67 (1906), reprinted in 4 E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt.
J [hereinafter Dec. 1906 Hearings]; Arguments on S 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the
Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-7, 20-21, 33-39, 77, 151-52 (1906),
reprinted in 4 E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. H [hereinafter
June 1906 Hearings].
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for subsequent efforts at copyright revision. ' The efforts during the
1920s and 1930s to amend the copyright law to permit adherence to
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works 12 rested upon inter-industry negotiations and collapsed
when those negotiations collapsed. 13 The twenty-one year effort
that culminated in the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act' 4 again
depended upon officially sponsored meetings among those with
vested interests in copyright. 5 Recent efforts to amend our law to
conform to the requirements of the Berne Convention involved a
similar process.16 The ongoing endeavor to write copyright amendments that make specific provision for new communications media
relies heavily on inter-industry negotiations and stalls whenever
those negotiations stall." Indeed, the informal understanding
II See generally Goldman, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901
to 1954, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-

(Comm. Print 1960). A single, notable exception is the process that led to the
enactment of Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 117), amending the copyright statute to make explicit provision for computer
software. The text of the 1980 amendment was suggested by the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), a learned commission
charged with divining a solution to the problems posed by computers and photocopy
machines. See infra note 399.
12 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 168 CTS 185, originated in 1886 and has been revised six times since then. See
generally Black & Dworkin, Forewardto Opening Speech of Arpad Bagsch at the Conference Celebrating the Centenary of the Berne Convention, 11 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS
1 (1986). Berne is a multilateral copyright treaty that mandates copyright protection
without formalities for works created by authors of Berne nations and works first published in Berne nations. Until 1988, the United States remained one of the few developed countries that had not yet acceded to Berne. The Senate finally ratified the Berne
Convention in the final hours of the 100th Congress. See Legislation: Bill Making Copyright Act Compatible With Berne Convention Passes House, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 699 (Oct. 20, 1988); see also Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
13
See Goldman, supra note 11, at 4-11.
14 General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV)).
15 See Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857 (1987).
16Olson, supra note 2, at 121. See FINAL REPORT OF THE AD Hoc WORKING
GROUP ON U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 1-4, reprinted in 10
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 513-16 (1986). See generally U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 47 (1987).
17 Proposed legislation for satellite broadcasting and the use of home satellite dishes
has been pending in Congress for several years. Congressional efforts to encourage inter-industry negotiations finally culminated in the enactment of compromise legislation
last autumn. See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3985
SION
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among copyright scholars and practitioners is that copyright revision is, as a practical matter, impossible except through such a

process.18
The process Congress has relied on for copyright revision, however, has shaped the law in disturbing ways. The inter-industry negotiations that resulted in the 1909 Copyright Act sought to revise a
body of law based on an old model in order to enable it to embrace
a variety of new media. Industries for whom the old law worked
well sought to retain their advantages;19 industries that found the
old law inadequate sought profound changes in the way the copyright statute treated them.2" Affected interests compromised their
disputes by treating different industries in disparate ways. The draft
bill that emerged from the conferences among industry representatives defined particular copyright rights with reference to the type
of work in which copyright was claimed, 2 1 and the statute enacted
in 1909 retained the draft bill's essential strategy. Authors of particular classes of works were granted specific, enumerated rights;
rights differed among the classes of copyrightable works.22 Thus,
the 1909 Act gave the proprietor of the copyright in a dramatic
work the exclusive right to present the work publicly, 23 the proprietor of the copyright in a lecture the exclusive right to deliver the
(1988); Olson, supra note 2, at 121-22. The bill introduced in 1987, H.R. 2848, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 279-85
(July 16, 1987), included provisions endorsed by the satellite industry and the Copyright Office but not by the major television networks. The staff of the House subcommittee encouraged ongoing negotiations over the bill and scheduled H.R. 2848 for
mark-up repeatedly during the spring of 1988. Agreement proved elusive, and each
mark-up session was canceled abruptly. Finally, in July of 1988, the networks and satellite carriers reached a compromise; only then did the House subcommittee move on
the bill, incorporating the compromise into the legislation. See Legislation: House
Passes Legislation on Satellite Retransmission, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 636 (Oct. 13, 1988); Legislation: House Committee OKs Animal Patenting,
Satellite Retransmission Legislation, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 346,
347 (Aug. 4, 1988).
18 See, e.g., Kaminstein, Introduction to Viewpoints on the General Revision of the
Copyright Law - The American Bar Association Copyright Symposium at Chicago, August 1963, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SoC'y 3, 4 (1963); Olson, supra note 2, at 11; cf.
Home Video Recording, supra note 2, at 77 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
19 See, e.g., COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, 1ST SESS., supra note 6, at 15-17 (remarks of
Charles Scribner, American Publishers' Copyright League).
20
See, e.g., id. at 21-23 (remarks of Don C. Seitz, American Newspaper Publishers'
Ass'n).

21 See S. 6330, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1, 4, 18 (1906), reprinted in I E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. B; infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
22 See 1909 Act, supra note 10, §§ 1, 4, 5; infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
23 1909 Act, supra note 10, § l(d).
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work in public for profit,24 the proprietor of the copyright in a musical composition the exclusive right to perform the work publicly
for profit except on coin operated machines, 25 and the proprietor of
the copyright in a book no performance or delivery right
whatsoever.
The drafters of the 1976 Act pursued similar goals to different
conclusions. Congress and the Copyright Office again depended on
negotiations among representatives of an assortment of interests affected by copyright to draft a copyright bill. 26 During twenty-one
years of inter-industry squabbling, the private parties to the ongoing
negotiations settled on a strategy for the future that all of them
could support. Copyright owners were to be granted broad, expansive rights, including future as well as currently feasible uses of
copyrighted works. Each of the copyright users represented in the
negotiations, meanwhile, received the benefit of a privilege or exemption specifically tailored to its requirements, but very narrowly
defined.2 7 The 1976 Act solved the problem of accommodating
future technology by reserving to the copyright owner control over
uses of copyrighted works made possible by that technology.
Broad, expansive rights were balanced by narrow, stingy
28
exceptions.
A comparison of the immediate futures of the 1909 and the 1976
Acts reveals that they failed the future in similar ways. Narrow
provisions became inapplicable or irrelevant as technology developed, while those interests absent from the meetings of industry
representatives encountered significant legal barriers to their activities. The inflexibility of specific provisions distorted the balance
that the statute's drafters envisioned when it was enacted, and interested groups came running to Congress to plead for quick fixes.
This history illustrates that broad rights and broad exceptions swal24
Id.
25

§ 1(c).
Id. § 1(e).

26

I have described the legislative process that produced the 1976 Copyright Act in an

earlier article. See Litman, supra note 15.
27 See id. at 883-88; infra notes 234-312 and accompanying text.
28 Cases interpreting the 1976 Act have not described it this way; the interpretation is
my own. See Litman, supra note 15, at 882-96. Courts have, for the most part, perceived the statute as striking some balance between rights and exceptions, but they have
not characterized that balance in general terms. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429-33 (1984). The disparity between the breadth of the
rights granted in 17 U.S.C. § 106 and the narrow specificity of the exceptions and limitations detailed in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118, however, is patent. The 1976 Act's legislative
history suggests a rationale behind that disparity. See infra notes 229-312 and accompanying text.
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low up their specific counterparts. Because technological development will change the world that a copyright law seeks to order, the
law needs flexible provisions of general application.2 9
In this Article, I explore how the process of drafting copyright
statutes through negotiations among industry representatives became entrenched, and what that process has cost us in our efforts to
deal rationally with technology.3" Part I traces the birth of the conference process and its shaping of the 1909 Act. Part II describes
how the conference process became a fixture of copyright revision
during later efforts to amend the statute. Part III examines the
strengths and weaknesses of a legislative process predicated on negotiations among interested parties. Part IV explores the distortions that the process imposed upon the massive revision effort that
produced the 1976 Copyright Act. Part V focuses on the problems
posed by new communications media and private use as illustrations of the 1976 Act's weaknesses. Part VI surveys recent legislative activity and suggests that the conference process disserves both
affected industries and members of Congress. I nonetheless conclude that no meaningful reform of the process is likely.3 '
I
THE FIRST CONFERENCES

Until the copyright revision that culminated in the 1909 Act, the
legislative process accompanying copyright enactments differed little from the process yielding most statutes: interested parties sent
See infra notes 313-72 and accompanying text.
1 will proceed more or less chronologically, because the stresses posed by new technology and the disputes among industries affected by copyright were more straightforward when the number of technological innovations and industries in the game were
fewer than they have since become. The turn of the century dispute between music
publishers and the manufacturers of player pianos shares many similarities with the
current brawl among motion picture producers, television broadcasters, cable systems,
and the operators of communications satellites, but the parallels are easier to see if the
simpler disputes are explored before tackling the more complicated ones.
31 Because the focus of my Article is the process that yields copyright legislation, I
will not address, except in passing, see infra note 396, the strategies that courts might
employ to interpret or reinterpret copyright statutes in ways that would circumvent
statutory weaknesses. That topic is a fascinating and complex one in its own right, and
raises significant separation of powers concerns. See generally Davidson, Common Law,
Uncommon Software, 47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1037, 1067-70 (1986); Rosen, A Common
Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769 (1984); Froomkin,
Climbing the Most DangerousBranch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process (Book
29

30

Review), 66 TEX. L. REv. 1071 (1988).
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petitions to Congress.3 2 The majority of bills were drafted by representatives of affected interests, who then requested members of Congress to introduce the bills, 3 wrote petitions to Congress in their
support, and testified in their favor during Patent Committee hearings.3 4 By 1900, the body of copyright law was a pastiche of inconsistent amendments grafted on a basic structure that conflated (and
sometimes confused) copyrights, patents, and trademarks.3 5 Efforts
toward general statutory revision foundered as a "result of difficulties in obtaining a quorum of the Patents Committee to give attention to this subject."3 6
32

E.g.,

MEMORIAL OF PETER

TO APPOINT COMMITTEES

S. Du

PONCEAU AND OTHERS, PRAYING CONGRESS

OF INQUIRY ON THE SUBJECT OF COPYRIGHT, AND TO

ON THE SUBJECT, S. DOC. No. 309, 25th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1838). See H. REP. No. 16, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868); S.REP. No.
494, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. (1838); see generally LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT IN
CONGRESS, 1789-1904. (1976 Reprint of 1905 ed.) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT IN
AWAIT THEIR REPORT BEFORE ACTING

CONGRESS].
33 See, e.g.,

International Copyright. Statements on S. 191 and S. 1178 Made before
the Sen. Comm. on Patents, 49th Cong., IstSess. 4 (1886) (remarks of Sen. Hawley) (S.
191 drafted by authors' association and introduced by Hawley at its request).
34 See COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 96-377.
35 Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress responded to new developments by
enacting discrete amendments to meet particular exigencies. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 1,
1882, ch. 366, 22 Stat. 181 (amending Rev. Stat. § 4962 to permit manufacturers of
molded decorative articles to affix copyright notice on the bottom of the articles). By
the turn of the century, United States copyright law had become arcane and complex.
See generally LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1903, S.DOC. No. 10, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69

(1903) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1903 REPORT] ("Our present copyright system is a
highly technical one, largely due to its uneven development by means of many separate
enactments dealing with particular matters, or framed to meet special exigencies."); id.
at 443-45 (detailing examples). The law was riddled with internal contradictions and
discrepancies and lacked the flexibility to adjust to the growth of new works and media.
Id. at 443-68. Copyright owners complained of technicalities. See COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, lST SESS., supra note 6, at 15-16 (remarks of Charles Scribner, Periodical
Publishers' Ass'n of America); id.at 18-19 (remarks of W.A. Livingstone, Print Publishers' Ass'n of America); id. at 20 (remarks of John W. Alexander, Soc'y of American
Artists); id. at 137-38 (colloquy). Judicial opinions were inconsistent and confused. See
generally R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS LAW AND LITERATURE 8-20 (1886); E.S.
DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
43-53, 434-67 (1879).
36 Copyright Legislation, 49 PUBLISHERS' WEEKLY 856 (May 23, 1896). Although
the Register of Copyrights, in his 1903 Report to the Librarian of Congress, characterized two nineteenth century statutes as general revisions of the copyright laws, see REGISTER'S 1903 REPORT, supra note 35, at 443-68, neither statute represented a
comprehensive overhaul. By general revision, Register Solberg appears to have meant
only that the two statutes re-enacted the copyright laws rather than merely amending
them. The first, enacted in 1831 after lobbying by Dr. Noah Webster, extended the
initial copyright term to 28 years and added musical compositions to the subject matter
of copyright. See Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48, 49-50 (1925). The
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Beginning in 1901, the recently appointed Register of Copyrights
pleaded repeatedly with Congress to appoint a special commission
to revise the copyright law.3 7 Members of the Senate Patent Committee, however, were hostile to the idea of a commission.38 The
Librarian of Congress suggested that Congress instead pass a resolution authorizing the Library of Congress to convene a conference
of experts and interested parties to consider a codification of the
copyright laws. The members of the Senate Patent Committee concluded that it would be improper for Congress to authorize such a
conference, but suggested that they would be delighted if the Librarian were to call an unauthorized conference on his own motion.3 9
The Librarian of Congress followed the Patent Committee's suggestion and invited representatives of authors, dramatists, painters,
sculptors, architects, composers,' photographers, publishers of various sorts of works, libraries, and printers' unions to a series of
meetings in New York City. 4 The invitees represented the beneficiaries of the rights granted by existing copyright statutes.4 2 The
second, in 1870, consolidated the copyright, patent, and trademark laws in connection
with the general effort of transforming the extant federal laws into the Revised Statutes;
it made few substantive changes but did introduce language into the copyright law that

invited confusion with the patent laws. See REGISTER'S 1903

REPORT,

supra note 35, at

444-45; Solberg, supra, at 50. Six statutes enacted between 1831 and 1870, and 10 statutes enacted between 1870 and 1900, accomplished more substantive amendment. See
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS:
STATES SINCE
37

See

1783

RELATING TO COPYRIGHT

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE

(1902);

LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED

31-59 (1963).

30, 1902, S. DoC. No. 6, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-65

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE

30, 1901, S. Doc. No. 35, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-61

(1901); REGISTER'S 1903 REPORT, supra note 35, at 68-69, 467-68.
38 See Solberg, supra note 36, at 62.
39 Letter from Sen. A.B. Kittredge, Chairman of Senate Comm. on Patents, to Hon.
Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress (January 27, 1905), reprinted in 5 E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. M, at 5.
40 Although composers' representatives were invited to attend, their presence was
nominal. See Dec. 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at 385 (colloquy).
41 See COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, 1ST SESS., supra note 6, at vii-xv; Solberg, supra
note 36, at 62-63.
42 The extant copyright statutes extended copyright to the works of the creators and
publishers, privileges to the libraries, and job protection to the printers' unions.
The Librarian also invited representatives from the National Educational Association
as surrogates for the public interest. They attended some of the sessions but did not
actively participate. See June 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at 57-58 (remarks of Mr.
Putnam, Librarian of Congress). Bar Association representatives, in contrast, participated enthusiastically and assisted the Copyright Office in the actual drafting of the bill.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING 35-37

(1906).
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Librarian did not invite representatives from interests that had not
43
yet received statutory recognition; the motion picture industry,
the piano roll industry, and the "talking machine" (phonograph)
industry received no invitations.' No invitee commented on their
absence.
A year later, the conferences yielded a bill, and joint hearings in
Congress commenced. It quickly became clear that the doubts of
Senate Committee members about the propriety of a conference of
private interests had been well-founded. 4 5 Witnesses who had not
been invited to the conferences found the whole procedure scandalous.4 6 Indeed, some went so far as to suggest that Congress was
being hoodwinked by a monopolistic conspiracy.4 7 The Librarian
43 Motion pictures were then in their infancy. Thomas Edison had invented the kinetoscope in 1889. By the turn of the century, short, plotless motion pictures were
being exploited commercially. Under the copyright law then in force, creators of motion pictures could register their films for copyright only as "photographs." See Edison
v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1903); American Mutoscope & Biograph v. Edison
Mfg., 137 F. 262, 266-67 (D.N.J. 1905).
44 One representative of the talking machine industry became aware of the conferences and politely crashed one of its sessions. See June 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at
151 (remarks of Mr. Putnam, Librarian of Congress).
45 Some of the remarks made during the hearings by members of the committees
support an inference that their nervousness about the drafting process figured in their
decision to delay reporting the bill. See, e.g., June 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at 153
(colloquy); see also Arguments on H.R. 11, 943 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1906) (colloquy).
46 See Dec. 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at 26-29 (testimony of F.W. Hedgeland,
Kimball Co.); id. at 170 (written statement of Herbert Fromme, attorney for band directors); June 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at 53 (testimony of George W. Oglivie,
publisher); id. at 77 (testimony of Paul H. Cromelin, Columbia Phonograph Co.); id. at
97 (testimony of G. Howlett Davis, inventor of talking machine devices); id. at 110
(testimony of John O'Connell, representing player piano and piano roll companies); id.
at 145-46 (testimony of S.T. Cameron, American Gramophone Co.); id. at 190 (written
brief submitted by F.W. Hedgeland, Kimball Co.).
47 See Dec. 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at 73-77 (testimony of William P. Cutter,
Forbes Library); id. at 277-83 (testimony of Albert H. Walker, attorney); id. at 298-313
(testimony of George W. Pound, DeKleist Musical Instrument Co.); id. at 337-44 (testimony of Paul H. Cromelin, Columbia Phonograph Co.); June 1906 Hearings, supra
note 10, at 98 (testimony of G. Howlett Davis, inventor of talking machine devices); id.
at 127 (testimony of H.N. Low, piano roll industry); id. at 166-70 (testimony of Albert
H. Walker, attorney). Witnesses representing talking machine and piano roll manufacturers charged that an illegal combination of music publishers and the Aeolian Company, a manufacturer of player pianos and piano rolls, had conspired to draft a
provision of the copyright bill that would enable Aeolian to secure a monopoly on piano
rolls of popular songs in return for Aeolian's promise to pay royalties to the music
publishers. Charges of monopoly, trust, and other restraints of trade remained popular
among witnesses in many subsequent copyright revision hearings. See, e.g., sources
cited infra notes 77 & 93.
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of Congress became increasingly defensive.48
The copyright bill produced by the conferences conferred significant advantages upon composers and music publishers, who had
participated, at the expense of the piano roll and talking machine
industries, which had not. Extant case law held that the manufacture of piano rolls did not infringe the copyright in the underlying
musical composition.4 9 The bill, however, gave copyright owners
the exclusive right to make or sell any mechanical device that reproduced the work in sounds, thus making the unlicensed manufacture
of piano rolls and phonograph records illegal. 5" The opposition
from piano roll and talking machine companies to the bill derived
significant weight from their complaints about the process and dominated the 1906 hearings. At the request of the House and Senate
Committees, the bill's original authors drafted a substitute bill limiting the mechanical reproduction provisions that the piano roll and
talking machine interests opposed."1 Nonetheless, a majority of the
House Committee voted to delete the mechanical reproduction subsection completely. 5 2 A minority of the House Committee filed a
dissenting report supporting a third version of the disputed subsection.5 3 The majority of the Senate Committee reported favorably on
a bill incorporating yet a fourth version,5 4 while the Senate minority
48 See Dec. 1906 Hearings,supra note 10, at 31-33 (remarks of Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress); June 1906 Hearings, supra note 10, at 17-18, 109, 148, 151-52
(remarks of Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress).
49 See Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584 (C.C. Mass. 1888).
50
See S. 6330, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(g) (1906). Two years later, the Supreme
Court settled the issue, agreeing with prior case law and ruling that manufacture of
piano rolls (and, by analogy, phonograph records) did not infringe the copyright in the
underlying musical composition. White-Smith Music Publishing v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908). That ruling remained good law only until it was superseded by the 1909
Act.
51 See H. REP. No. 7083, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1907), reprinted in 6 E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. N.
52 See id. In revising the bill, the House Committee also limited the conference bill's
definition of copyrightable subject matter, restricted the performance rights in musical
compositions to public performance for profit, reduced the duration of the copyright
term, and introduced a procedure in lieu of renewal. Compare H.R. 25,133, 59th Cong.,
2d Sess. §§ 1, 4, 18 (1907), reprinted in 6 E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note
6, at pt. N, with S. 6330, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1, 4, 18 (1906) reprinted in I E.F.
BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. B.
53
See H. REP. No. 7083, pt. 2, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1907), reprinted in 6 E.F.
BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. P.
54
See S. REP. No. 6187, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1907), reprinted in 6 E.F. BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. Q.

HeinOnline -- 68 Or. L. Rev. 286 1989

Copyright Legislation and Technological Change

report supported the House Committee majority's position."
None of the bills reached a vote, and, in the following year, a
proponent of each of the four camps introduced a bill reflecting its
position. 6 At the joint hearings held on the four bills, testimony
was as divisive as it had been two years earlier.5 7 At the end of the
hearings, a representative of popular song writers suggested that the
song writers might sit down with the piano roll and talking machine
manufacturers and the music publishers' association in order to
agree on a compromise solution.5 8 Representative Currier, the
chairman of the House Committee, urged the parties to adopt such
a plan, and a spokesman for the piano roll industry disclosed that
he had, in fact, begun to explore negotiations with his opponents
earlier in the day. Representative Currier assured the witnesses
that, if they could reach agreement, the bill would pass. The Senate
Committee Chairman echoed his enthusiasm for the plan and adjourned the hearings.5 9
The copyright bill introduced in February of 1909 included a solution that apparently embodied the agreement of the affected parties.6 ° The relevant provision differed from prior proposals; it
established a compulsory license 6 for mechanical reproductions of
music and entirely exempted the performance of musical compositions on coin operated devices.62 The bill also incorporated a side
agreement or two that the private parties had reached along the
55

See S. REP. NO. 6187, pt. 2, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1907), reprinted in 6 E.F.

BRYLAWSKI & A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. R.
56
See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1908, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-93 (1908).
57

See 1908 Hearings, supra note 10, at 188-93 (testimony of Victor Herbert, Authors'
and Composers' Copyright League of America); id. at 194-218 (testimony of Nathan
Burkan, attorney); id. at 353 (testimony of George W. Pound, DeKleist Musical Instrument Co.). One witness submitted his own substitute bill. See id. at 293-97 (testimony
of Frank L. Dyer, Nat'l Phonograph Co.). The major players insisted that a compromise solution would be impossible. See, e.g., id. at 361 (testimony of Robert Underwood Johnson, American (Authors') Copyright League).
58 See id. at 365 (remarks of William Kendall Evans, Words and Music Club).
59 See id. at 368-69 (colloquy).
60
See 43 CONG. REC. 3765-67 (colloquy).
61 A compulsory license limits the copyright owner's exclusive rights by prohibiting
her from refusing to license a particular use. Users are entitled to use the copyrighted
work on statutory terms for a statutory fee. The compulsory license included in the
1909 bill provided that once a copyright owner had authorized a mechanical reproduction (a piano roll or phonograph record) of a musical composition, other concerns were
entitled to produce their own mechanical reproductions of the work at the statutory
royalty of two cents per record or roll manufactured. See S. REP. No. 9440, 60th Cong,
2d Sess. § 1(e) (1909).
62
See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1909). The exemption for coin
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way. 6 3 It was enacted within the month.

II
THE

1909
A.

ACT IN A CHANGING WORLD

The Conferences Reprised

At the same time the Committees were struggling with the revision bill, the Kalem Company hired a writer to read the novel Ben
Hur and write a scenario for a motion picture, which it proceeded
to produce. The motion picture industry had been operating without concern for the copyright laws. A few motion pictures had been
registered for copyright as "photographs," 6 4 but the industry was
paying no more attention to the copyrights in works it used for its
raw material than had the piano roll and talking machine industries
before it. 5 The copyright in the novel Ben Hur belonged to Harper
Brothers Publishers, and Harper Brothers slapped the Kalem Company with a copyright infringement suit. In 1911, the United States
Supreme Court held that the exhibition of the movie infringed the
copyright in the novel.6 6 The Kalem Company settled the suit for
$25,000, and the motion picture industry woke up and got in touch
operated machines was intended to shield the promotional playing of songs in penny
arcades, which were thought to increase the sales of sheet music. See id.
63 Negotiations between a representative of the American (Authors') Copyright
League and representatives of the International Typographical Union, for example, produced a provision exempting foreign books written in foreign languages from the bill's
manufacturing clause, which required all copyrighted books to be printed from type set
in the United States. See Solberg, supra note 36, at 64-65. In addition, the bill revived
the renewal term.
64 See supra note 43.
65 Lawyers for the motion picture industry, often the same lawyers that represented
the talking machine industry, contended that the production of motion pictures based
on copyrighted works did not violate the current copyright laws, and may well have so
advised their clients. See Townsend CopyrightAmendment: Complete File ofArguments
On H.R. 15,263 and H.R. 20,596 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess. 17-18, 22, 41 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 Hearings] (remarks of John O'Connell, Motion Pictures Patent Co.).
66 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). The lower court held that the
motion picture itself did not infringe the novel, relying on an analogy to piano rolls,
which the Supreme Court held did not infringe the copyright in underlying musical
compositions. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The court, nevertheless, concluded that showing the motion picture violated the copyright owner's exclusive right,
under Rev. Stat. 4952, to dramatize the novel. Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61
(2d Cir. 1909), affid, 222 U.S. 55 (1911). The Supreme Court agreed that exhibition of
the film infringed plaintiffs dramatization rights. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 61. Defendant
did not itself exhibit the film but sold or leased copies of the film for others to exhibit.
The Supreme Court concluded that defendant's distribution of copies to others for public exhibition was contributory infringement. Id. at 62-63.
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with its Congressmen.6 7
Motion pictures had barely been mentioned in the hearings on
the 1909 Act; 68 the motion picture industry had not bothered to
attend. 69 After Kalem Co. v. HarperBrothers, however, the motion
picture industry faced the prospect of liability under a statute that
had been drafted without its interests in mind.7 ° It prepared a bill
to amend the copyright statute to limit the motion picture industry's exposure in copyright infringement actions and asked Representative Edward Townsend of New Jersey to introduce the bill in
Congress."
Townsend introduced the movie industry bill in January of 1912;
the House Patent Committee scheduled it for hearings that same
month.7 2 The Committee made no initial effort to notify interested
parties of the pending bill.7 3 A representative of the live theatre
industry, however, learned of the hearings and showed up at them
without invitation.7 4 The hearings that followed threatened to become a replay of the talking machine dispute. Most of the witnesses
who testified before the Committee were the same people who testified in 1906 and 1908."5 Although some of them represented differ67 See 1912 Hearings,supra note 65, at 8-9, 65-73 (remarks of Frank L. Dyer, Edison
Electric Co.). During the early 1910s, the motion picture industry was concentrated in
New Jersey, Philadelphia, and New York City. Congressmen representing districts in
which motion picture producers were located spearheaded the industry's efforts to
amend the copyright statute in the House of Representatives.
68 See 1908 Hearings, supra note 10, at 24, 31, 175-78 (testimony of Ligon Johnson,
Nat'l Ass'n of Theatrical Managers); id. at 180-98 (various witnesses).
69 Two of the representatives of talking machine companies said a word or two on the
motion picture industry's behalf. See id. at 281-82 (testimony of Frank L. Dyer, Nat'l
Phonograph Co., on behalf of the Edison Mfg. Co.); id. at 309-11 (testimony of Paul H.
Cromelin, American Musical Copyright League, on behalf of Mr. Whitman of the
Cameraphone Co.).
70
See 1912 Hearings, supra note 65, at 17-22 (remarks of John O'Connell, Motion
Pictures Patent Co.).
71 See id. at 7 (testimony of Rep. Townsend). Among Townsend's New Jersey constituents were Thomas Edison and his Edison Electric Company. Mr. Edison invented
an early motion picture camera; Edison Electric produced motion pictures.
72 See id. at 3.
73 See id. at 3 (remarks of Ligon Johnson, Nat'l Ass'n of Theatrical Producing
Managers).
74 See id.
75 For example, Frank Dyer testified in 1906 on behalf of the Edison Phonograph
Works and the National Phonograph Company. He returned in 1912 to speak for
Edison Electric Company, a motion picture company. William Brady testified as a theatrical producer in 1908 and as the President of the National Association of Producing
Managers in 1912. John O'Connell represented the National Piano Manufacturers Association of America in 1906 and 1908 and returned in 1912 as the representative of the
Motion Pictures Patent Co.
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ent interests this time around, their arguments and counter
arguments had a familiar ring.7 6 As was the case in the earlier hearings, opponents of the legislation testified that its supporters were
conspirators in thrall to a dastardly trust.7"
To head off a full-scale re-enactment, Representative Alexander
suggested that the parties negotiate privately to reach a compromise
solution, and twice asked the Committee to adjourn its hearings to
permit the private negotiations to continue.7 8 The parties reached
an agreement in March of 1912 and turned their draft of a bill over
to Representative Townsend for introduction.7 9 The agreement resolved the theatre industry's objections to the bill, but disadvantaged authors of nondramatic works, who had not been involved in
the controversy.8" The Copyright Office questioned the wisdom of
aspects of the compromise, 8 but the Committee reported the bill
with only minor changes.8 2 Enactment followed swiftly.
B. New Players Join the Game
The lesson an industry observer might have expected to learn
from the preceding saga of copyright legislation was that interested
parties were well advised to work out their differences before involving Congress. And, indeed, that was precisely what affected industries attempted to do with all subsequent efforts at copyright
76 See, e.g., 1912 Hearings, supra note 65, at 34, 74 (testimony of Ligon Johnson,
Nat'l Ass'n of Theatrical Managers); id. at 41 (testimony of John O'Connell, Motion
Pictures Patent Co.).
77 See id. at 29-30 (testimony of Augustus Thomas, Soc'y of American Dramatists
and Composers); id. at 31-32, 60-61 (testimony of William Brady, Nat'l Ass'n of Producing Managers); id. at 64, 74-78 (testimony of Ligon Johnson, Nat'l Ass'n of Theatrical Managers).
78 See id. at 44-45; id. at 94. Initial efforts to reach agreement broke down after three
weeks, and motion picture industry representatives gave Rep. Townsend their own version of a compromise proposal. See id. at 50-51 (remarks of Augustus Thomas, Soc'y of
American Dramatists and Composers); id. at 79 (remarks of John O'Connell, Motion
Pictures Patent Co.). The proposal was unacceptable to the bills' opponents. See id. at
60-78 (various witnesses). Rep. Alexander asked the parties to try again. Id. at 94.
79 See id. at 95-96.
80 The bill sharply reduced the statutory damages available for infringement of a nondramatic work by a motion picture. It did not, however, significantly reduce the statutory damages available for infringement of dramatic works. See H.R. 24,224, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1912). A provision of the bill that the committee later deleted would
have limited the copyrightability of scenarios. See sources cited infra note 81.
81 See 1912 Hearings,supra note 65, at 106-09 (testimony of Thorvald Solberg, Register of Copyrights); see also Townsend Copyright Amendment: Hearing on H.R. 22,350
Before the House Comm. on Patents, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-9 (1912) (testimony of J.J.
O'Connell, motion picture industry).
82
See H.R. REP. No. 756, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912).

HeinOnline -- 68 Or. L. Rev. 290 1989

Copyright Legislation and Technological Change

revision. Seeking inter-industry consensus, however, became significantly more complicated in the years that followed.
Shortly after the enactment of the Townsend amendment in 1912,
the structure of industries affected by copyright changed dramatically. In 1914, representatives of music publishers and composers
formed the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) to enforce collectively the members' rights to perform
their musical compositions publicly for profit. ASCAP began a
campaign to make the nominal performance right remunerative.83
On November 2, 1920, the first commercial radio broadcasting station opened with a broadcast of the Harding election returns.8 4 Radio receiving set manufacturers pioneered radio broadcasting as a
promotional device; other concerns soon recognized the potential of
radio advertising.8 5 Within a few years, there were radio stations
throughout the nation. During the 1920s, the motion picture industry grew more powerful. U.S. companies produced "talkies" and
began exporting their movies to Europe.
Despite the enactment of the Townsend amendment, motion picture producers grew increasingly uncomfortable with the formalities of a copyright statute written without attention to their needs.86
83 Composers and music publishers found it impossible to enforce the public performance right in individual compositions. ASCAP members pooled their compositions into
a repertory and offered blanket licenses that permitted establishments to perform any
composition in the repertory during the license term. ASCAP set the single, up-front
blanket license fee for an establishment on the basis of the size of the business. Motion
picture theatres, for example, paid an annual fee equal to ten cents per seat. ASCAP's
sales tactics drew great ire from affected businesses. An ASCAP representative would
first offer to sell a blanket license. When the business refused to purchase one, ASCAP's
representatives would monitor the business, document its performance of ASCAP
songs, and then sue for infringement. Many businesses chose to purchase licenses to
settle the litigation. Others went to court, where ASCAP routinely prevailed. See, e.g.,
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty, 283 U.S. 191 (1931). See generally Oman, Source Licensing: The Latest Skirmish in an Old Battle, 11 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 251, 25253 (1987).
84See Ashby, supra note 7, at 331.
85 Id.at 332.
86 The 1909 Act imposed formalities prerequisite to the securing of copyright, which
were based on assumptions appropriate to works exploited by publishing printed copies.
A story could not be registered for copyright, for example, until it had been published
with correctly placed and worded notice identifying the owner of the copyright. The
courts interpreted these requirements rigidly. See generally W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE
COPYRIGHT LAW 138-57 (6th ed. 1986). Although the Townsend amendment addressed problems surrounding registration of motion pictures, it had not altered the
formal requirements for copyright in other works. Motion picture producers found that
these provisions posed significant obstacles to their efforts to secure clear title to works
they wished to use in their films. See Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137
Before the House Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-13 (1924) [hereinafter
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Representatives of the motion picture industry met with authors'
representatives in New York and agreed to convene private copyright conferences, along the model of those that produced the 1909
Act, to work out a consensus on copyright revision.8 7 Representatives of authors, book and periodical publishers, printers, labor unions, librarians, and motion picture producers met in conferences
over a number of years and hammered out the details of a copyright
revision bill.8 8 Motion picture counsel completed a draft of the bill,
and Representative Frederick William Dallinger introduced it in
1924.89 Participants in the conferences, however, had not sought
the advice of broadcasters or the talking machine industry and had
sought, but not received, the advice of composers and music publishers.9 ° Nor had the representatives of motion picture producers
consulted the theatre owners who exhibited their films. When the
supporters of the Dallinger bill arrived in front of the House Patent
Committee, they discovered that the industries they failed to invite
to their conferences were pursuing their own agenda.
Both motion picture theaters and radio stations used popular music in their programs. Apparently, theatre and station owners gave
copyright infringement little thought until ASCAP showed up on
their doorsteps demanding royalties. 9 ' When ASCAP went to
1924 House Hearings] (testimony of Louis E. Swarts, Motion Picture Producers and
Distributors of America).
87 See 1924 House Hearings,supra note 86, at 311-27 (testimony of Louis E. Swarts,
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America).
88 See Copyrights: Hearingson H.R. 11,258 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess. 475-79 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 House Hearings] (testimony of Louis E.
Swarts, Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America); see also id. at 34-45
(testimony of Matthew Woll, Nat'l Allied Printing Ass'n); id. at 436-39 (testimony of
Arthur W. Weil, Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America).
89 H.R. 8177, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). See A Bill to Amend the Copyright Act
andSecure InternationalCopyright (H.R. 8177), 105 PUBLISHERS' WEEKLY 1113 (Mar.
29, 1924). The Dallinger bill, modeled on the British Copyright Statute of 1911, provided for automatic copyright and adherence to the Berne Convention, see supra note
12. The bill contained provisions that would have greatly clarified the motion picture
producers' title to the copyright in motion pictures and in the underlying works used for
motion pictures, and would have simplified producers' acquisition of rights. See H.R.
8177, supra, §§ 45(c), 45(d), 46.
90 See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 88, at 437-38 (testimony of Arthur W. Weil,
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America); id. at 475-79 (testimony of
Louis E. Swarts, Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America). During the
same period of time, ASCAP initiated its own, ultimately unsuccessful, conferences
with representatives of radio broadcasters. See To Amend The Copyright Act: Hearings
on S. 2328 and H.R. 10,353 before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
236-39 (1926) [hereinafter 1926 Joint Hearings] (testimony of E.C. Mills, ASCAP).
91 See, e.g., 1926 Joint Hearings, supra note 90, at 5 (testimony of Paul B. Klugh,
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court and got injunctions, 92 radio stations and motion picture theatre owners went to Congress to seek ASCAP's abolition.9 3 Members of Congress introduced various bills to restrict ASCAP's
activities, exempt radio stations and theatre owners from liability
for infringement, or narrow the right to perform musical compositions publicly for profit.9 4 The Patent Committee scheduled hearings on pending legislation, and the two legislative agendas collided
in the House Committee hearing room.9 5
In hearings before the House Patent Committee, numerous witnesses testified that the copyright law was inadequate and needed
revision. They disagreed sharply, however, on the form that reviNat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters); 1924 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 75 (testimony of
Paul B. Klugh, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
92 See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories, 5 F.2d 411 (6th
Cir. 1925); M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923).
93 See 1924 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 1-255 (various witnesses); Broadcasting
and Copyright, 105 PUBLISHERS' WEEKLY 1802 (May 31, 1924). The feud between the
broadcasting industry and ASCAP grew increasingly hostile over the years. See, e.g.,
1926 Joint Hearings, supra note 90, at 242-63, 276 (testimony of E.C. Mills, ASCAP);
id. at 372-72, 383-91 (testimony of Nathan Burkan, ASCAP); id. at 419-23 (testimony
of Paul E. Klugh, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters); see infra note 103 and accompanying
text.
94
See, e.g., S. 2600, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
95 1924 House Hearings, supra note 86. The story is, in fact, more complicated than
the discussion in text would indicate. Many copyright bills were introduced in the 68th
Congress and referred to the Patent Committees. In addition to the bills drafted by the
motion picture industry and by the broadcasters, the House Committee had on its plate
two bills written by the Copyright Office. Introduction of the Dallinger bill was spurred
by opposition to the Lampert bill, H.R. 2704, 68th Cong, 1st Sess. (1924). The Lampert
bill had been drafted by Register Solberg to permit the United States to adhere to the
Berne Convention with minimal change in extant domestic copyright law. Motion picture counsel sought Register Solberg's advice on the Dallinger bill. Solberg voiced his
opposition and suggested that conference participants endorse the Lampert bill as the
best that they could get in the current political climate.
Perhaps because of its discomfort with supporting a bill opposed by the Register of
Copyrights, the Authors' League then approached Register Solberg and asked him to
draft an alternative comprehensive revision bill. Solberg had been involved with the
Berne Convention since its inception and had long admired the more author-oriented
copyright laws in force on the European continent. Solberg drafted a bill based on the
Berne Convention and the copyright laws of European nations. See Solberg, supra note
36, at 66-75. Rep. Perkins introduced Solberg's draft as the Perkins bill in 1925. The
Authors' League and ASCAP endorsed the Perkins bill over the Dallinger bill. Printers
and labor unions, enraged by the Authors' League's defection, announced they would
reconsider the concessions they had made in the compromises reflected in the Dallinger
bill. This galvanized most of the other conference participants to oppose the Perkins
bill. See generally 1925 House Hearings, supra note 88. Ironically, the National Association of Broadcasters objected to the Perkins bill on the ground that the Register, in
drafting it, had not followed the conference procedure that yielded the 1909 Act. See id.
at 198 (testimony of Paul Klugh, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
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sion should take. Most of the witnesses endorsed one of a half
dozen bills pending before the committee and testified solemnly that
adoption of any of the other bills would bring the progress of science and the useful arts to a screeching halt.96 Representatives Sol
Bloom and Fritz Lanham expressed their frustration with the testimony, and Representative Bloom inquired whether any solution to
the various disputes would be feasible.9 7 An author of the Dallinger
bill suggested that the lawyers for the interests affected by copyright
have another try at the conference approach over the summer.9"
House Committee members endorsed the suggestion, with the proviso that the list of invitees be broader than before. Representative
Randolph Perkins pointedly suggested the importance of including
broadcasters, while Representative Bloom proposed that members
of the House Committee also attend.9 9 After some bickering among
witnesses about starting points for discussion, Perkins persuaded
them to give the idea of further conferences serious consideration.
Bloom successfully moved the appointment of a subcommittee to
oversee the effort. l°
The Committee appointed Bloom to head a five-person subcommittee. The meetings began the following April'0 1 and continued
for nearly a year. The list of invitees was initially expansive.'0 2 In
an early meeting, however, representatives of ASCAP had a rancorous exchange with representatives of the National Association of
Broadcasters, and the broadcasters withdrew in a huff.'0 3
96

See, e.g., 1925 House Hearings, supra note 88, at 34-35 (testimony of Matthew
Woll, Int'l Allied Printing Ass'n); id. at 136-37 (testimony of John Paine, Victor Talking Machine Co.); id. at 227-31 (testimony of Alfred Smith, Music Indus. Chamber of
Commerce); id. at 426-27 (testimony of Gabriel Hess, Motion Picture Producers and
Distributors of America); 1924 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 169-71 (testimony of
E.C. Mills, ASCAP); id. at 249-50 (testimony of Charles H. Tuttle, Nat'l Ass'n of
Broadcasters); id. at 253-55 (testimony of George P. Ahrens, Motion Picture Owners
Ass'n).
97 See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 88, at 367 (remarks of Rep. Lanham); id. at
483 (remarks of Rep. Bloom).
98 Id. at 483-84 (colloquy).
99 Id. at 484 (colloquy).
10ld. at 485-86 (colloquy).
101 See Copyright Conferences Resumed, 107 PUBLISHERS' WEEKLY 1432 (April 25,
1925).
102 See Copyright: Hearings on H.R. 10,434 Before the House Comm. on Patents,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1926) [hereinafter 1926 House Hearings](testimony of F.A.
Silcox, United Typothetae of America). Initially, the conference met as a large group.
Later, members met in roughly 150 small meetings to work out bilateral or trilateral
agreements on specific issues.
103 See 1926 House Hearings, supra note 102, at 193-96 (testimony of L.S. Baker,
Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
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After numerous meetings, representatives of almost all of the participating industries agreed on the text of a bill. The centerpiece of
the bill would have enabled the United States to adhere to the Berne
Convention,'o° an international copyright treaty mandating copyright protection without formalities. The language and structure of
the bill reflected its compromise nature. Individual clauses had
been created through several series of bilateral negotiations and fit
together awkwardly.'o It also lacked any accommodation for the
absent broadcasters' concerns. Nonetheless, the bill, introduced as
the Vestal bill in the 69th Congress, had a long list of endorsements.
The broadcasting industry, of course, opposed the bill bitterly and
allied with the talking machine industry and the theatre owners to
block it.' °6 Simultaneously, they pursued legislation to privilege
public performance and broadcast of music.'0 7
The Vestal bill languished in Congress for several years, accumulating opposition from libraries, periodical publishers, academics,
and a splinter group of theatrical producers, 0 8 as well as broadcasters, motion picture producers, and the talking machine industry. In
1930, supporters of the Vestal bill intensified their efforts toward
enactment. 0 9 During the 71st Congress, the House Patent Com04

See supra note 12.
The Register of Copyrights gave this reason for preferring his own Perkins bill
over the draft that emerged from the conferences. See 1926 House Hearings, supra note
102, at 227-39.
106 See, e.g., id. at 193-98 (testimony of L.S. Baker, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters); id.
at 199-206 (testimony of Fulton Brylawski, Motion Picture Theatre Owners of
America). Although representatives of the talking machine industry and of the theatre
owners had participated in the conferences throughout, they were unable to reach
agreements with ASCAP. See id. at 302-03 (testimony of Alfred L. Smith, Music Industries Chamber of Commerce).
107 See generally 1926 Joint Hearings, supra note 90.
108 See General Revision of the Copyright Law.: Hearings on HR. 6990 Before the
1

105

House Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1930) [hereinafter 1930 House Hearings] (testimony of Carl Cannon, American Library Ass'n.); id. at 144 (testimony of
George C. Lucas, Nat'l Publishers' Ass'n); id. at 161-69 (testimony of William Klein,
Shubert Theatre Group).
109 The catalyst for this activity was the approaching deadline for accession to the
Berlin text of the Berne Convention. See id. at 59-61 (testimony of Rep. Sol Bloom).
See generally Solberg, The International Copyright Union, 36 YALE L.J. 68, 85-102
(1926). The Berlin text permitted a nation to adhere to Berne while specifying reservations to provisions of the Convention. A 1928 revision of the convention in Rome,
scheduled to come in to force in 1931, removed the privilege of adhering with reservations. See generally Goldman, supra note 11, at 7. Thus, if the United States wished to
adhere to Berne subject to reservations, it was necessary to do so by August of 1931. At
no time during the many efforts to accede to Berne over the past 100 years, including
the drive that culminated in the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, have
industry representatives agreed on anything resembling wholehearted compliance with

HeinOnline -- 68 Or. L. Rev. 295 1989

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68, 1989]

mittee held further hearings on the Vestal bill." 0 Authors' representatives met with representatives of organizations opposed to the
bill throughout the night during the hearings and reached further
compromises on disputed provisions."' Witnesses thus explained
to the House Committee that they had opposed the bill during the
previous day's testimony, but were now willing to endorse it." 2
Members of the Committee urged that further negotiations proceed
with dispatch." 3 Representative Lanham suggested that one dispute be settled on the spot, in the hearing room and during the
testimony." 4 As a result of the hasty negotiations, the House Committee reported the Vestal bill favorably, observing that "practically
all the industries and all the authors have united in support of this
revision."' 5
"Practically all the industries," of course, was not quite the same
as all of the industries. Industries that had gotten little satisfaction
from the conferences persuaded members of Congress to press their
proposals on the floor of the House. The House of Representatives
voted in favor of the Vestal bill only after adopting floor amendments restricting ASCAP's activities and privileging for-profit public performances of phonograph records and receptions of radio
broadcasts. "6
Berne's provisions. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. H10,094-98 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988); 134
CONG. REC. S14,551-S14,566 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988); see also Olson, supra note 2, at
121 ("To make ... consensus possible, the Berne bill was stripped of those provisions
that threatened major interest groups."). See generally U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, supra note 16.
110 1930 House Hearings, supra note 108.
111 See id. at 140-41 (testimony of William Hamilton Osborne, Authors' League of
America).
112 See, e.g., id. at 100-02 (testimony of Carl Cannon, American Library Ass'n).
113 See, e.g., 1930 House Hearings,supra note 108, at 264 (testimony of William A.
Brady: "Throughout your different hearings, many of your members have suggested to
the publishers and authors 'Why not get together? Why not go out in the hall and have
a little talk and settle this matter?' "); see also 72 CONG. REC. 12,000 (1930) (remarks of
Rep. Busby).
114 1930 House Hearings, supra note 108, at 155. When William Warner, of the National Publishers' Association, alluded to a disagreement between authors and periodical publishers over the ownership and scope of serialization rights, Rep. Lanham
suggested that Warner interrupt his testimony in order to permit authors to express
their views and then negotiate an immediate resolution. Id.
115 H.R. REP. No. 1893, 71st Cong, 2d Sess. 8 (1930).
116 74 CONG. REC. 2006-37 (1931); 72 CONG. REC. 12,007-15, 12,473-75 (1930); see
Solberg, The Present Copyright Situation, 40 YALE L.J. 184, 201-02 (1930). The House
debated, but ultimately defeated an amendment that would have made ASCAP's activities illegal and a complete defense to an infringement suit brought by one of its members. See 74 CONG. REC. 2031 (1931).
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The amendments, however, failed to mollify the bill's opponents.
When the House referred the bill to the Senate, representatives of
broadcasters, radio and phonograph manufacturers, and motion
picture theatre owners demanded that the Senate hold hearings to
receive testimony in opposition to the bill."' After listening to the
testimony, the Committee settled on a series of amendments and
reported a by now complex, and internally inconsistent, Vestal bill
to the Senate floor, where it got caught in a filibuster on another
matter.

18

In the following Congress, the House Committee started over.
The new Committee Chairman scheduled extended hearings and
met privately with industry representatives." 9 He then introduced
a bill that embodied his notion of a fair compromise. In the face of
opposition from the motion picture theatre owners, map publishers,
and broadcasters, he revised the bill to incorporate their suggestions.' 2 ° Motion picture producers and distributors and ASCAP
denounced the changes.'21 Chairman Sirovich rushed the bill to the
House floor under a special rule, 122 but the opposition of other
members of the House Patent Committee killed the bill before it
1
could be put to a vote. 23
Meanwhile, private negotiations began to collapse in the face of
the Depression economy. Organizations that made concessions in
the spirit of compromise in 1926, 1928, or 1930 were no longer satisfied with their bargains. 124 At the suggestion of a representative of
117 See General Revision of The Copyright Law: Hearings on H.R. 12,549 Before the
Senate Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1931) (remarks of Chairman
Waterman).
8
'' See Goldman, supra note 11, at 6-7.
119 Private industry representatives continued to meet among themselves in the now
familiar conferences.
120 See General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings on H.R. 11,948 Before the
House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1932) (remarks of Chairman Sirovich).
ASCAP also insisted on amendments, but Chairman Sirovich declined to adopt them.
See id.
121 See id. at 45-70 (testimony of Gabriel L. Hess, Nat'l Distributors of Motion Pictures); id. at 83-160 (testimony of Nathan Burkan, ASCAP). Among the changes was
an amendment sharply reducing the remedies available for the unauthorized exhibition
of motion pictures. See id. at 28-29 (testimony of Abram F. Meyers, Allied States Ass'n
of Motion Picture Exhibitors).
122 75 CONG. REC. 11,059 (1932).
123 Goldman, supra note 11, at 7. See 75 CONG. REC. 11,065-72 (1932).
124 See, e.g., International Copyright Union: Hearings on S. 1928 Before the Senate

Comm. on Foreign Relations, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Senate
Hearings] (testimony of M.J. Flynn, American Fed'n of Labor) (printing unions currently oppose adherence to Berne unless publishers agree to raise wages).
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organized labor, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asked
the State Department to organize an informal committee of State
Department, Copyright Office, and Commerce Department representatives to oversee further private negotiations. 25 The interdepartmental committee held a series of conferences with
representatives of affected interests. They drafted a bill that proved
to be acceptable to broadcasters and to the other interests that had
opposed the Vestal bill. 2' 6 Authors, composers, publishers, motion
picture producers, and organized labor, however, found the bill
completely unacceptable and promptly got off of the bandwagon. 127
Strong support from the administration enabled the bill to pass the
Senate, but strong opposition from interested parties caused it to
perish in the House.' 28
With copyright revision stalled in Congress, a private foundation
attempted to restart it. The National Committee of the United
States of America on International Intellectual Cooperation called
its own copyright conferences. 2 9 After sixteen months of meetings,
it was unable to arrive at a bill that everyone would support. The
Committee drafted a bill nonetheless.' 3 ° The bill went nowhere.
125 See Revision of the Copyright Laws. Hearingsbefore the House Comm. on Patents,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 221-60 (1936) [hereinafter 1936 House Hearings](testimony of Sen.
F. Ryan Duffy). A representative of the printing and typographic unions requested that
the State Department be enlisted to mediate between publishers and organized labor.
Publishers favored adherence to Berne. Labor unions facing Depression wages demanded higher pay or statutory provisions to protect American printing jobs in return
for labor's support of the treaty. See 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 124, at 90-91
(colloquy).
12 6
See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 125, at 260-89 (testimony of Wallace McClure, Dep't of State); id. at 337-40 (letter from Wallace McClure to Phillip Loucks,
Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters); id. at 1068-74 (prepared statement submitted by Wallace
McClure, Dep't of State).
127 1936 House Hearings,supra note 125, at 279-80 (remarks of Chairman Sirovich);
see Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Senate Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong., 1st Sess 3-15
(1935) (testimony of Louise Silcox, Authors' League of America); id. at 15-26 (testimony of Gene Buck, ASCAP); id. at 47-49 (testimony of John G. Payne, Music Publishers' Protective Ass'n); id. at 53-56 (testimony of Gabriel Hess, Motion Picture
Producers and Distributors of America); id. at 739-43 (testimony of Thorvald Solberg,
former Register of Copyrights).
28
1 See Duffy, InternationalCopyright, 8 AIR L. REV. 213, 220 (1937).
29
1 See Copyright Group Making Progress, 135 PUBLISHERS' WEEKLY 1281 (April 1,
1939).
130 S. 3043, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940). See 86 CONG. REC. 63-78 (1940); Goldman,
supra note 11, at 10-11; see also Chafee, supra note 7 (comparing major provisions of the
Shotwell bill with then-current law). See generally Note, Copyright-Adherence to the
InternationalCopyright Union and Proposed Copyright Reform (Shotwell bill), 12 AIR L.
REV. 49 (1941).
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After twenty years of private negotiations, the second world war
intervened, and efforts to revise the copyright statute died.
III
SHORTCHANGING THE FUTURE

The history of copyright revision efforts during the first half of
this century demonstrates how a process of private negotiations, initially adopted as an expedient alternative to a government commission, 13 1 came to dominate copyright revision. A closer look at the
substance of some of the negotiations reveals insights about the
strengths and weaknesses of that process as a method of drafting
statutes.
Throughout the various conferences, interests that were absent
from the bargaining table were shortchanged in the compromises
that emerged. The Librarian of Congress's conferences in 1905 and
1906 excluded the piano roll and talking machine interests; the bill
that emerged disadvantaged them.' 3 2 The motion picture industry
attended none of the negotiations that resulted in the 1909 Act and
found the statute a significant hindrance. 133 The 1912 negotiations
between motion picture and theatre industries to frame the Townsend Amendment yielded a compromise that handicapped authors
4
and publishers of nondramatic works, who did not participate. 13
The conferences in the 1920s that led to the Dallinger bill included
no representatives of the broadcasting industry; the Dallinger bill
gave publishers and composers rights at the broadcasters' expense. 135 The broadcasters walked out of the conferences that produced the Vestal bill; the Vestal bill addressed none of the
13 6
broadcasters' concerns.

At first glance, this observation seems intuitively obvious. Parties
who are negotiating would seem to have no incentive to safeguard
the interests of their absent competitors. On further consideration,
however, the persistent shortchanging of absent interests seems
more startling. The battles that preceded the enactment of the 1909
Act should have demonstrated to the participants that interests excluded from negotiations could effectively block legislation. Many
See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text; supra note 86.
134 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
36
1 See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
131

132
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of the participants in the later conferences had been privy to the
1906 and 1908 hearings. Even had the threat been dismissed or
forgotten, the controversy that surrounded the Dallinger bill' 3 7
should surely have persuaded conference participants to make some
accommodation for absent parties in connection with the Vestal
bill. Yet, the compromises that were made emerged only after faceto-face bargaining, either within the conferences or at the last min138
ute in response to congressional pressure.
If the parties' desire to draft enactable legislation would seem to
engender consideration for those excluded, other forces made that
accommodation difficult. The division of rights among competing
interests became increasingly complex and interdependent. The
compromises that emerged from the conference approach were
rarely bilateral. Authors conditioned concessions to motion picture
producers on their receipt of concessions from organized labor who
in turn demanded something from publishers.' 3 9 In the ensuing
complex web of interrelated concessions, the hypothetical demands
of absent parties got lost.
The understandable tendency of stakeholders to view representatives of the upstart future as poachers on previously settled territory
also influenced the course of negotiations. 4 o Composers, sheet music publishers, and musicians divided up the world in a satisfactory
manner before the producers of piano rolls and talking machines
entered their markets. Novelists, dramatists, photographers, book
publishers, and theatrical producers had comfortable niches before
motion picture theatres came on the scene. Excluding newcomers
from the benefits conferred by copyright legislation may have
seemed like a necessary corollary to protecting one's turf.
Indeed, the interests that had not yet come into being when the
negotiations took place were the quintessential excluded parties.
They threatened competition with all current stakeholders and
posed no apparent threat of lobbying against legislation. As one
might expect, then, they were the parties most likely to find that the
negotiated compromises operated to their disadvantage. The industries that chafed most under the provisions of the 1909 Act, for
example, were the motion picture and broadcast industries: the for137 See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 95-97.
140 See, e.g., 1924 House Hearings,supra note 86, at 105-11 (testimony of Gene Buck,
ASCAP); 1908 Hearings,supra note 10, at 173-79 (testimony of Ligon Johnson, Nat'l
Ass'n of Theatrical Producing Managers).
138

139
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mer barely begun and the latter not yet imagined at the time the
Librarian of Congress called his conferences in 1906.'
The motion picture and broadcast industries found the 1909 Act
particularly inhospitable because it required emergent industries to
adapt themselves to conform to ill-fitting molds. A statute could
pose difficulties for a new technology simply because its general provisions seem not to anticipate the specific circumstances of a new
invention. That, however, is a problem shared by most legislation.
The problems inherent in the 1909 Act were more pernicious, because its drafters crafted the language to settle particular, specific
inter-industry disputes.
The 1909 Act's strategy for reconciling competing demands
among industry representatives was to specify rights and remedies
within subject matter categories. The conferences began in 1905
with each organization's articulation of its wish list.' 4 2 Each of the
affected interests sought to retain the advantages it enjoyed under
current law, while eliminating features that worked to its detriment.
Where wishes appeared irreconcilable, the parties suggested differentiation of provisions along subject matter lines.' 43 The solutions
to many disputes were provisions detailing the particular rights attaching to particular categories of works, the particular actions that
constituted infringement of those rights, and the particular remedies available for those infringements.' 4 4 The bill introduced in the
59th Congress followed this strategy.' 4 5 For example, the original
bill varied the term of copyright among different classes of works,
from twenty-eight years for prints and labels, to life of the author
plus fifty years after death for musical compositions. In addition, it
placed a ten year limit on the exercise of the exclusive dramatization right in a book.14 6 In tinkering with the bill, the House and
141 See, e.g., General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1932) (remarks of Louis G. Caldwell, Nat'l
Ass'n of Broadcasters).
142 COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, IST SESS., supra note 6, at 7-26; see also STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LIBRARIAN'S CONFERENCE ON
COPYRIGHT, 2D SESSION, IN NEW YORK CITY, Nov. 1-4, 1905, at 7-29, 33-35, reprinted in 2 E.F. BRYLAWSKI AND A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. D [hereinafter
COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE,
143

2D SESS.]

See COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE, 1ST SESS., supra note 6, at 45-48, 51-53, 77-84.
144 See STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LIBRARIAN'S CONFERENCE

ON COPYRIGHT, 3D SESSION,

AT LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,

WASHINGTON,

D.C., MARCH 13-16, 1906, at xxix-lxiv, xcv-c, reprinted in 3 E.F. BRYLAWSKI AND A.
GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. E.
14 5
See S. 6330, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906).
146See S. 6330, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 18, 20 (1906).
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Senate committees removed some of the distinctions but added
others. Thus, Congress replaced the variable copyright terms with
a uniform renewable term of twenty-eight years.' 4 7 On the other
hand, the 1906 bill treated the performance rights in musical compositions and dramatic compositions similarly. The bill that Congress enacted gave the rights different scope and established
different remedies for their infringement.' 48
The extent to which the 1909 Act's category-specific language encompassed new technology was difficult to predict. Although the
specificity of terms initially provided security to the affected industries, the growth of new forms and methods made the language
seem increasingly ambiguous. The development of the mimeograph
machine, for example, created doubts about the reach of a provision
requiring all books to "be printed from type set within the limits of
the United States, either by hand or by the aid of any kind of typesetting machine, or from plates made within the limits of the United
States from type set therein."' 4 9 When the word roll, a piano roll
with lyrics printed alongside the perforations that produced the music, superseded the simple piano roll, it was unclear whether the
compulsory license for mechanical reproductions of music permitted the addition of printed lyrics. 5 o
The statutory language posed more radical problems for the new
media. The infant industries found the 1909 Act ambiguous and its
application to their activities uncertain until the courts issued an
authoritative ruling. 5 ' Courts, in turn, struggled to apply the 1909
Act's language to fact patterns that its drafters never envisioned.
As case law developed, the application of copyright law to new
technology depended more on linguistic fortuity than anything
47

See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909).
Compare S. 6330, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ l(d), l(f), 23(b)(3) with 1909 Act,
supra note 10, §§ l(d), l(e), 25(b). See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
149 17 U.S.C. § 15 (1909). Congress amended the section in 1926 to preserve the
copyrights in mimeographed books from forfeiture. See Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat.
818.
150 See, e.g., 1926 Joint Hearings,supra note 90, at 86-87 (testimony of Alfred Smith,
Music Industries Chamber of Commerce). The courts held that the statutory mechanical license did not permit the reproduction or distribution of printed lyrics. See Standard Music Roll v. F.A. Mills, 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
151 See, e.g., General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Patents,72d Cong., 1st Sess. 174-75 (1932) (testimony of Louis G. Caldwell,
Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters); id. at 405-06 (testimony of George P. Aarons, Motion
Picture Theatre Owners); General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings on H.R.
10,976 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 206-07 (1932) (testimony of Frank A.K. Boland, American Hotel Ass'n).
1

148
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else. 152
Determining the scope of copyright protection for motion pictures, for example, required courts to decide such questions as
whether the exhibition of a motion picture constituted "publication" within the meaning of the 1909 Act.'5 3 Was a motion picture,
specifically enumerated in subsections (1) and (m) of section 5, also
a "dramatic or dramatico-musical composition" as specified in subsection 5(d), or, if not, could it still be deemed a "drama" for the
purposes of subsection 1(d)?' 54 If so, was exhibiting the film a "performance"? Should projecting the frames of a motion picture be
characterized as making a "copy" of the motion picture 5 5 or as
"dramatizing" it? 156 Radio broadcasting posed similar problems.
Was the broadcast of music to receiving sets in individuals' homes a
public performance?' 5 7 Was broadcasting at no charge to listeners
a performance for profit? 1 58 Was it a public performance for profit
to install a radio receiving set and loud speakers in hotel guest
59
rooms? 1
152

See 75 CONG. REC. 11,062 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Sirovich):

At the time of the passage of the 1909 Act, radio broadcasting was an unknown quantity. Because of certain general provisions of that act, such as
"public performance" and "mechanical reproduction" it turned out that dramatic and musical compositions were protected over the radio, but the act
nowhere provided for protection over the radio in any other respect. The author of literary works is not protected under the present law.
See also Varmer, LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING RIGHTS 104-07, reprinted in SuBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE

JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., lST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (Comm. Print 1960).

153 See, e.g., Patterson v. Century Prod., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937); Tiffany Prods.
v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931). The majority of courts held that exhibition was
not publication.
154 See, e.g., Metro Goldwyn Mayer Distrib. v. Bijou Theatre, 3 F. Supp. 66 (D. Ma.
1933); Tiffany Prods., 50 F.2d at 914-15.
155 See Patterson, 93 F.2d at 493-94; Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 3 F. Supp at 73-74. A
few courts concluded that the projection was indeed a copy. See Varmer, supra note
152, at 104-07.
156 See Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 3 F. Supp. at 73; cf Kalem Co. v. Harper Bro., 222
U.S. 55 (1911) (applying prior law). Kalem held that projecting a motion picture dramatized the book on which it was based, even if the motion picture was not itself a copy of
the book. Some courts extended that rationale. See Varmer, supra note 152, at 105-06.
157 See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories, 5 F.2d 411
(6th Cir. 1925). Most courts held that it was. But see Jerome H. Remick & Co. v.
General Elec., 4 F.2d 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
158 See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F.2d 776 (D.N.J. 1923).
The majority of courts said yes.
159 See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty, 283 U.S. 191 (1931). The court held that it
was. But see Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (holding that
installing a radio receiving set and loud speakers in a delicatessen was not a performance). Under the case law that developed, both radio broadcasting and the playing of
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The nature of the legislation that emerged from the conference
and compromise process increased the problems of applying a narrowly worded statute to industries transformed by technological
change. Multilateral bargaining produces statutes ill-suited to
traditional interpretation. It is problematic to discuss a statute's
"overall purpose" in connection with a web of negotiated deals." 6
Where specific provisions are predicated on the peculiarities of individual industries, and new industries develop their own very different peculiarities, it is difficult to formulate a basis for drawing the
appropriate analogies.
Industries, however, adjust in time to even the most inhospitable
law. 16 ' Where the copyright statute failed to accommodate the realities faced by affected industries, the industries devised expedients,
exploited loopholes, and negotiated agreements that superseded
statutory provisions. The broadcast industry formed its own performing rights society to compete with ASCAP.' 62 The recording
industry developed a form license that incorporated the basic concept of a compulsory license for mechanical reproduction, but at
more favorable terms, and used it instead of the license conferred by
the statute. 163 The motion picture industry established an ASCAPlike operation to deal with unauthorized exhibition of films.' 64 An
enterprising group of talking machine manufacturers used the copyright exemption for the performance of musical compositions on
coin operated devices

65

to launch the jukebox industry, and mar-

keted jukeboxes to establishments that wished to play music but not
radio broadcasts in large commercial establishments infringed the copyrights in the music that was played, but radio broadcasts were not themselves copyrightable.
160
See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 540-44; Posner, supra note 8, at 273; infra notes
203-27 and accompanying text; see also Litman, supra note 15, at 879-82.
161 See, e.g., General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) (testimony of Will Irwin, Authors'
League of America).
162 See Oman, supra note 83, at 252. The broadcasters' performing rights association,
Broadcast Music, Inc., was established in 1939 as a performing rights society owned
entirely by broadcasters. Like ASCAP, it licensed its entire repertory of compositions
for a flat fee. See generally Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
163 See 1926 Joint Hearings, supra note 90, at 314-15 (testimony of Nathan Burkan,
ASCAP); id. at 86 (testimony of Alfred L. Smith, Music Indus. Chamber of
Commerce).
164 See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 125, at 1026-37 (testimony of Gabriel L.
Hess, Nat'l Distributors of Copyrighted Motion Pictures).
165 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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to pay royalties. 166
IV
THE POST-WAR REVISION EFFORT

A.

Returning to Conference

By the end of the second world war, industries had been operating within the confines of the 1909 Act for a third of a century.
Everybody criticized the law as outmoded;' 6 7 it had, after all, been
drawn to accommodate the requirements of particular media before
the advent of radio, jukeboxes, sound motion pictures, Muzak®,
and now television.' 6 8 The affected industries accommodated the
arcane law through combinations of trade practice, 169 collectively
bargained form contracts, 170 and practical contortions.171 The re66

See General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 199-208 (1932) (testimony of Erwin M. Treusch, Automatic Music Indus.).
167 See, e.g.. Chafee, supra note 7, at 503, 516-22; Ebenstein, supra note 7, at xv-xx;
Stern, supra note 7, at 512. Even the industries that had opposed all prior proposals for
change came to view the outmoded 1909 Act as unsatisfactory.
168 Television was invented in the 1920s, but the first commercial television broadcast
station began operation in 1942.
169 See, e.g., Recording and Performing Rights in Certain Literary Works: Hearings
on H.R. 3589 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-8 (1951) [hereinafter 1951 House Hearings] (testimony of John Schulman,
Authors' League of America); Kaminstein, DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHTS 18-25, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS OF THE SENATE
1

COMM.

ON THE JUDICIARY,

86TH CONG.,

1ST SESS.,

COPYRIGHT LAW

REVISION

(Comm. Print 1960). The trade practice in periodical publishing, for example, involved
a complicated series of conveyances of the copyright in contributions to the periodical
in order to achieve the publisher's acquisition of the rights it needed and the author's
reservation of other rights without forfeiting the copyright. See id. at 18-22. In the
music industry, prevailing practice gave the music publisher legal title to the copyright,
but the publisher behaved as if it held certain portions of the copyright in trust for the
composer. Although composers did not have legal title to their copyrights, they routinely granted some rights to ASCAP and similar organizations without the publishers'
formal participation. See id. at 23-24. These practices made little legal sense because
the courts treated copyright in a work as an indivisible whole. See generally id. at 1-17.
170 See, e.g., Blaisdell, THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSE 92100, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,

IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION

(Comm. Print 1960); Henn, THE COMPULSORY LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 44-53, reprinted in SUBCOMM.

ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND

PATENTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,

IST SESS., COPY-

RIGHT LAW REVISION (Comm. Print 1960). Composers, music publishers, and drama-

tists, for example, belonged to associations that acted as bargaining agents and
negotiated complicated form contracts for the transfer or licensing of rights. These associations behaved like labor unions but were not labor unions because composers and
dramatists were not employees for the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.
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suiting distortions in industry structure and clout produced new
vested interests and hardened bargaining positions.72
Industry representatives, having learned the difficulty of comprehensive statutory reform, declined to press for complete revision.
Instead, they focused their legislative efforts on obtaining narrow
amendments to redress specific grievances. Some of the bills introduced at the behest of particular industries succeeded;1 73 others became perennial visitors in successive congressional sessions.' 7 4
The most imperative problem after the war was the United
States' isolation from international copyright relations.' 7 5 Prior efforts to amend the copyright law to permit adherence to the Berne
Convention had ended in failure.' 76 The government directed its attention to devising a way to establish international copyright relaSee Blaisdell, supra, at 91-92; Note, Copyright in the Stage Direction of A Broadway
Musical, 8 COLUM.-VLA JL. & ARTS 309, 323 n.94 (1983).
171 See, e.g., Kaminstein, supra note 169, at 18-22; Henn, supra note 170, at 44-47.
Securing copyright protection abroad for a work published in the U.S. required particularly convoluted procedures. Securing copyright protection in the U.S. for a work published abroad was, in some cases, even more troublesome. See Stern, supra note 7, at
508-11.
172 See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 7, at 517-18; Ebenstein, supra note 7, at xix. Proposals to eliminate the compulsory license for mechanical reproductions of music or to
increase the statutory royalty rate, for example, drew increasingly strident objections.
The dispute between jukebox owners and operators, who insisted on retaining the jukebox exemption, and composers and music publishers, who demanded its repeal, became
a pitched war. Suggestions that the United States eliminate the labor protection provisions contained in its copyright statute inspired fierce opposition.
173 See Act of July 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-575, 66 Stat. 752 (extending public
performance for profit and recording rights to nondramatic literary works, lectures, and
sermons); Act of June 3, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-84 (extending ad interim protection for
foreign books and periodicals).
174 Bills to repeal or restrict the jukebox exemption, see, e.g., H.R. 5473, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 1269, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. 3190, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1945), to extend limited copyright protection to recordings, see, e.g., S. 1206, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), and to provide copyright for textile designs, see e.g., H.R. 2860,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), showed up again and again.
175 Most of the world's developed nations had joined the Berne Convention and modified their copyright laws to accord with its terms. See supra note 12. This left the
United States with a copyright statute distinctly out of step with the international community, and dependent upon bilateral arrangements or simultaneous publication in
Berne nations for protection of its copyrights abroad. See Removal of Domestic Manufacturing Requirements for the Acquisition of Copyright by Certain Foreign Nationals:
Hearings on HR. 4059 before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 207-09 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 House Hearings] (testimony of Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights); id. at 3-4 (testimony of Luther E. Evans, Librarian
of Congress); American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law, Report of Committee No. 15: Programfor Revision of the Copyright Law, 1957
COMMITTEE REPORTS 51, 60-61; Stern, supra note 7, at 508-12.

176 See supra notes 10 1-30 and accompanying text.
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tions without undertaking the politically-charged endeavor of
overhauling the copyright statute to comply with Berne's requirements.' 7 7 The outcome was the Universal Copyright Convention.'78
The Copyright Office asked industries affected by copyright to delay
requests for statutory revision until the international effort could be
completed. 7 9 The strategy proved successful, but the clock continued to tick. The 1909 Act passed its fortieth birthday, and the need
for copyright revision failed to evaporate.
Meanwhile, the subject matter of copyright remained frozen in
the form it had taken in 1912. More recently developed works were
copyrightable only to the extent they could be analogized to the
statutory list of works subject to copyright and received rights
whose scope was limited by the category in which they best fit.
Decorative lamp bases and children's toys, for example, could be
registered as "works of art" or "reproductions of a work of art." 8 °
Motion pictures and television programs recorded on film could be
copyrighted as unpublished motion picture photoplays.' 8 ' Live or
taped television programs, radio programs, and phonograph records
were deemed uncopyrightable. Neither the copyright statute nor
case law recognized that the multiplicity of copyright rights could
177 The United States, working through UNESCO, used its new world power status
to craft a second worldwide copyright treaty designed to accommodate the quirks of
United States law without affecting copyright relations among Berne nations. See 1952
House Hearings, supra note 175, at 4 (testimony of Luther E. Evans, Librarian of Congress); id. at 209 (testimony of Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights). See generally
Henn, The Quest for International Copyright Protection, 39 CORNELL L. REV. 43
(1953). The government created a commission of interest group representatives and
government agency employees to facilitate domestic compromises. See Fisher, Introduction, 2 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 83 (1955).
178 Seven years of negotiations among United States and foreign industries under
UNESCO's auspices produced substantial concessions to American demands and near
unanimity in favor of the treaty among United States industry representatives. See Universal Copyright Convention and Implementing Legislation, Hearings on The Universal
Copyright Convention and S. 2559 Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Foreign
Relations and a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
177-79 (1954) (testimony of Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights). The Senate ratified
the treaty and Congress passed the modest implementing legislation the treaty required.
Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-743, 61 Stat. 655.
179 See Legislative Appropriationsfor 1956: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Legislative Appropriationsof the House Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 11516 (1955) (testimony of Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights).
180 See Derenberg, Copyright Law, in 1955 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
278, 280-81 (1956); Denicola, Applied Art and IndustrialDesign: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in UsefulArticles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 715-17 (1983).
181 See Cohn, Old Licenses and New Uses: Motion Pictureand Television Rights, 19
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 184 (1954); Kupferman, supra note 7.
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be separately owned and exploited.' 8 2 Because the law viewed
copyright as unitary, the industries relied on form contracts negotiated by industry groups to divide up control of subsidiary uses and
the revenues they produced.' 8 3 New technological uses waited in
the wings; how the copyright statute would affect them seemed
unclear.
To revive the process of comprehensive copyright revision, Congress returned to a suggestion that it had rejected summarily fifty
years before.' 8 4 In 1956, it appropriated funds5 for the appointment
8
of a special committee of copyright experts.
The Register of Copyrights, Arthur Fisher, initially conceived a
three year revision process that would depart significantly from the
familiar conferences. 18 6 Fisher envisioned a committee of copyright
experts acting in a purely advisory capacity, while the Copyright
Office's research division performed comprehensive studies of prior
revision efforts, copyright laws of other nations, and each of the
major substantive issues involved in copyright revision. The com182 See generally Kaminstein, supra note 169. Notwithstanding the courts' reluctance
to recognize the divisibility of copyright, most industries had long relied on the separate
licensing and exploitation of particular copyright rights. See sources cited supra note
169.
183 See sources cited supra note 170.
184 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
185 Legislative Appropriation Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 242, 69 Stat. 499; see H.R.
REP. No. 1036, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1956). Three members of Congress introduced
bills in the 84th Congress calling for the appointment of a special Presidential Commission to revise the copyright law. See H.R. 2677, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R.
5366, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. 1254, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). Two of the
bills would have set up a commission comprising three Senators, three Representatives,
and seven members appointed by the President, and charged them to return a report
within one year. See 101 CONG. REC. A1652-53 (1955) (extension of remarks of Rep.
Thompson, sponsor of H.R. 2677). The proposal alarmed members of the copyright
bar, who suggested that a more appropriate committee might be appointed by the Librarian of Congress, supervised by the Register of Copyrights (the Copyright Office and the
ABA enjoyed particularly cozy relations during those years), and composed exclusively
of copyright experts. See id. at A 1652 (reprinted letter from Prof. Walter Derenberg to
Rep. Thompson); American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, 1955 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 38. The Librarian of Congress included
the copyright bar's alternate plan in his annual appropriations request. See Legislative
Appropriationsfor 1956, supra note 179, at 114-23 (testimony of Luther E. Evans, Librarian of Congress, and Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights). The ABA adopted a
resolution disapproving the Presidential Commission bills, and Congress did not pursue
them further.
186

See

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CON-

GRESS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1959, H. Doc. No. 245, 86th Cong.,

2d Sess. 72-73 (1959) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1959 REPORT]. Ultimately, the revision
process lasted 21 years.
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mittee's job would be to offer comments and suggestions, but not to
make policy.' 8 7 Fisher hoped to keep the policy making process
insulated within the Copyright Office to avoid the partisan wrangling that infected prior legislation. 8I'
The Librarian of Congress appointed a panel of twenty-nine
copyright experts, the majority of whom were active in the American Bar Association.' 9 The panelists' ideas about their appropriate
role differed from the Register's, and they soon began requesting
that they convene in a forum that would permit the thrashing out of
policy.' 9 ° The Copyright Office acceded to requests to convene
meetings of the panelists for substantive discussions 9 ' but insisted
upon its prerogative to formulate recommendations for legislation
without further consultation.' 9 2
The ABA established a shadow committee, including many of the
panelists in its membership. The committee embarked on an effort
to formulate substantive proposals at the same time as it monitored
the Copyright Office's revision efforts.' 9 3 While the Copyright Of-

fice struggled to digest the studies and the panelists' suggestions and
to write a report in relative seclusion, the panelists themselves were
meeting with interested parties in ad hoc groups and symposia to
87

1

See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CON-

1956, H. Doc. No. 5, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 60 (1956) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1956 REPORT]; American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, 1957 COMMITTEE REPORTS 53 [hereinafter 1957 ABA SEC. REP.].
18 8
See sources cited supra note 187; see also REGISTER'S 1959 REPORT, supra note
186, at 72:
Much care and effort went into the framing of the 1909 law, but essentially it
was the product of compromises arrived at in conferences with interested
groups, each of which surveyed the field of copyright from its own special and
partisan point of view. Similar efforts between 1924 and 1940 to enact a general revision of the 1909 law ended in unreconciled controversies and failure.
General revision is being approached today in a somewhat different manner.
189
See 1957 ABA SEC. REP., supra note 187, at 55.
190
See id. at 55-67; American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law, 1959 COMMITTEE REPORTS 132-35; American Bar Association Section
of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, 1958 COMMITTEE REPORTS 92-93, 99-100;
American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, 1958
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 40.
191See REGISTER'S 1959 REPORT, supra note 186, at 77.
192 See Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection in Certain Cases: Hearingon
GRESS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,

H.R.J. Res. 627 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962) (prepared statement of John Schulman, American Patent Law
Ass'n).
193
See 1957 ABA SEC. REP., supra note 187.
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articulate substantive consensus. 194

Shortly before the Copyright Office completed the Register's Report to Congress, outlining recommendations for a revision bill,
Register Fisher died. His successor, Register Abraham Kaminstein, abruptly shifted gears. While Fisher appeared to have viewed
the history of inter-industry compromise as a weakness of prior revision efforts, Kaminstein seemed to read the record differently. He
argued that such compromise was the keystone of achieving copyright revision and that the goal of enacting a modern copyright statute was worth herculean efforts to encourage compromise among
interested parties. 1 95
Register Kaminstein began working toward conciliation 196 and
narrowly averted a crisis that threatened to derail the revision program.' 9 7 The substance of the Register's Report was poorly received by the Bar,"' a number of whose members insisted that they
194 The core of the consensus appears to have been the provisions that the Dallinger,
Vestal and Shotwell bills had in common. See 1957 ABA SEC. REP., supra note 187, at
57-58; Schulman, The Road to Progressin Revising the Copyright Law, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 433, 436-39 (1962).
195 See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1962, H. Doc. No. 5, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 70-71 (1962) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1962 REPORT].
196 The Register's Report was written without participation by the panel of experts.
Preliminary rumblings indicated that the panelists would resist its conclusions. Before
filing the Report, Kaminstein circulated it to the panel's members and solicited their
comments. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION:

REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN-

U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW xi (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter
CLR PART 1]. He added a conciliatory preface characterizing the Report's conclusions
as tentative, and insisting that the Copyright Office's "purpose in issuing this report is to
pinpoint the issues and to stimulate public discussion, so that the widest possible agreement can be reached on the principles to be incorporated in a revised statute." Id. at ix.
See also American Bar Association, Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law,
ERAL REVISION OF THE

1961

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

122-23 (address by Register Kaminstein inviting

members of the bar to participate in the drafting process). Kaminstein announced plans
for a series of meetings with interested groups to discuss the report, and promised that
the Copyright Office would consider all views expressed before drafting a bill. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1961, H. Doc.
(1961) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1961 REPORT].

No. 255, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66

197 Industry representatives and members of the copyright bar disliked the Register's
proposals for reform, which differed significantly from the consensus that they had
reached in their ad hoc meetings. The intensity of their opposition threatened to overwhelm the revision effort. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1963, H. Doc. No.
255, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1963) [hereinafter REGISTER'S 1963 REPORT]; sources
cited infra notes 198-200.
198 See, e.g., REGISTER'S 1963 REPORT, supra note 197, at 71; Schulman, supra note
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would prefer the current outmoded statute to one following the
Register's recommendations. 9 9 Kaminstein announced that the
Copyright Office was willing to abandon unpopular proposals.2"
He expanded the membership of the panel of experts and arranged
meetings with interested parties to encourage them to compromise
with one another.2 ° ' The result was, in essence, a return to the conference process. Six years of study had produced the Register's Report. Another five years of conferences produced a bill that
reflected the consensus of the conference participants and bore little
resemblance to the Register's recommendations. It took an additional eleven years in Congress for the interested parties to compromise on extraneous issues and late-breaking problems. When the
parties finally compromised on nearly every provision in the bill,
Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act.2 °2
B.

Private Parties and Vested Interests

The stormy history of past revision efforts led the Copyright Office to conclude that the only copyright bill that would pass was one
built on a network of negotiated compromises. The Copyright Office concentrated much of its energy on identifying affected interests
and including their representatives in the negotiations. But, of
course, it wasn't possible to invite every affected interest. Some interests lacked organization and had no identifiable representatives.
In the 1905 conferences, the Library of Congress had tried unsuccessfully to recruit representatives of composers to participate. Music publishers purported to speak for composers and were the only
representatives available. In the conferences convened in the 1960s,
painters and sculptors did not attend 20 3 and the Copyright Office's
194, at 434-38; see also Ringer, Viewpoint of the Copyright Office on General Revision of
the Copyright Law, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 37, 37 (1963) ("Practically all of [the
proposals] were criticized by somebody, and some of them were criticized by practically
everybody.").
199 See, e.g., CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 321-24 (written comments of Irwin Karp);
id. at 387-94 (written remarks of John Schulman).
200 See REGISTER'S 1963 REPORT, supra note 197, at 71-72; Kaminstein, The General
Revision Program, 10 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 81 (1962).
201 See, e.g., REGISTER'S 1963 REPORT, supra note 197, at 72; REGISTER'S 1962 REPORT,
20 2

supra note 195, at 70, 74.
See Litman, supra note 15, at 873-79.

203 See

HOUSE COMM.

ON THE JUDICIARY,

88TH CONG.,

IST SESS., COPYRIGHT

LAW REVISION PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
AND DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 269 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter CLR PART 3] (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors' League of America).
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efforts to seek them out proved unavailing. 2" Choreographers, theatrical directors, and computer programmers sent no representatives because they had no representatives to send. Other interests
that would have profound effect on copyright did not yet exist at the
time of the conferences. Just as there had been no commercial
broadcasters to invite to the conferences in 1905, there were no
video cassette manufacturers, direct satellite broadcasters, digital
audio technicians, motion picture colorizers, or on-line database
users to invite in 1960.
Nor could the rest of us be there. The amorphous "public" comprises members whose relation to copyright and copyrighted works
varies with the circumstances. Many of us are consumers of copyrighted songs and also consumers of parodies of copyrighted songs,
watchers of broadcast television and subscribers to cable television,
patrons of motion picture theatres and owners of videotape recorders, purchasers and renters and tapers of copyrighted sound recordings. Although a few organizations showed up at the conferences
purporting to represent the "public" with respect to narrow issues, 20 5 the citizenry's interest in copyright and copyrighted works
was too varied and complex to be amenable to interest group championship. Moreover, the public's interests were not somehow approximated by the push and shove among opposing industry
representatives. To say that the affected industries represented diverse and opposing interests is not to say that all relevant interests
were represented.20 6
The conference participants began as the members of the Library
of Congress's panel of experts and were all established members of
204See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm.,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1844 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings] (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights).
205 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5 76-77 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter CLR PART 5]
(remarks of John Schulman, Chairman of American Bar Association Committee 304);
id. at 64 (remarks of Charles F. Gosnell, American Library Ass'n); id. at 70 (remarks of
Nicholas E. Allen, Music Operators of America); CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 42527 (written comments of George Schiffer, on behalf of community television antenna
systems).
206 A participant in the process observed after reading a transcript of several of the
meetings that the public interest had received only passing attention, little effort had
been made to inform the public of the progress of the effort, and that the majority of
conference participants were, unsurprisingly, copyright lawyers. See Goldberg, Copyright Law Revision Part 2-A Review of the Record, 10 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 214,
216-17 (1962).
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the copyright bar. Other representatives joined the conferences as
particular conflicts arose. Register Kaminstein invited representatives of current beneficiaries of the statute to participate in discussions of cutbacks in their statutory benefits.20 7 Lawyers on the
panel solicited participation from their other clients.2 °" As with the
conferences on earlier legislation, however, participants were almost
exclusively those who already had a sizable economic investment in
copyright matters under current law. Although these participants
undoubtedly interacted with copyrighted works outside of their
professional capacity, they failed to bring that perspective to bear
on the conference negotiations.
Perhaps the most patent example of the partisan perspective that
dominated the negotiations is illustrated in the treatment of the issue of private use, an issue that has become increasingly vexing in
the years since the 1976 Act took effect. Presumably, all industry
representatives made private use of copyrighted works in their individual capacities. Yet, the issue of the appropriate scope of permissible private use of copyrighted works received little explicit
attention during the revision process. Representatives were too
busy wrangling over commercial and institutional uses to talk about
the behavior of individuals in their homes.2 0 9 The aggregate agendas developed in the conferences of private parties reflected systematic, if unintentional, bias against absent interests. 2 10 The fact that
207 The Register was not always successful in causing such interests to attend. Kaminstein speculated that his failure to turn up librarians or scientists to serve on the
panel was partly due to the fact that few librarians or scientists were members of the
bar, and partly due to the fact that their representatives were too busy to attend. See
CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 81 (remarks of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of
Copyrights).
208 See, e.g., CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 184-85 (remarks of Harriet Pilpel).
209 There were fleeting proposals during the conferences, for example, to extend the
copyright owner's exclusive performance right to cover private as well as public performances, or give the copyright owner control of individual book borrowing, but they
received little attention.
210 1 explore the systematic nature of that bias more fully below. An illustrative example is the treatment of charitable benefit performances. The revision bill that
emerged from the conferences included a privilege for charitable benefit performances
so long as performers, promoters and organizers received no compensation. See H.R.
4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109(4) (1965). In 1967, sponsors of agricultural fairs got
involved in copyright revision and managed to secure a privilege for performance of
musical works during agricultural fairs, without regard to any fees paid performers or
promoters. See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 110(6) (1969); see, e.g., Copyright Law
Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 621-23 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Rep. Kenneth Gray); id. at 625-27
(testimony of William Hartsfield, Southeastern Fair Ass'n). In ensuing sessions of Con-
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private use had no defenders and received no explicit treatment in
the revision conferences, therefore, had substantive results on the
legality of private use under the revision bill.
The public, of course, does have a designated representative; acting as that representative is Congress' job description. A few Congressional committee staff members did attend some of the
copyright conferences as observers, but stayed above the fray.21 l
The unspoken premise of the conference process was that Congress
would enact any bill that everyone else could agree on. Ultimately,
that is what Congress did.2 12
Much legislation advances the agendas of private interest groups.
Indeed, contemporary interest group theory holds that many, if not
most, statutes are purchased by special interests from legislators in
return for political support.2 13 Copyright legislation produced
through industry conferences nonetheless has some unusual features. Under the typical model, interest groups submit self-serving
proposals, and members of Congress evaluate whether the value of
supporting the proposals outweighs the political costs, necessarily
passing judgment on the substantive content of the proposed legislation. 214 The bargain between members of Congress and industry
representatives in connection with copyright legislation was of a different sort: Congress in effect agreed that if the industry representatives would invest the time and energy to develop a bill that all of
gress, the privilege became narrower and more qualified. See S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 110(6) (1976), reprinted in H.R. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976); S. 22, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 110(6) (1975). Veterans' and fraternal organizations did not, for the
most part, involve themselves in this dispute. But see 1967 Senate Hearings, supra, at
1361 (written comments from Troy Shrine Club supporting agricultural fair exemption). Shortly after the 1976 Act took effect, veterans' and fraternal organizations were
dismayed to learn that the new Act made them liable for copyright infringement unless
they negotiated licenses or ceased paying the bands that they hired to play at their
charitable benefits. See generally To Amend The Copyright Act, S. 2082: Hearings on S.
2082 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-43 (1981) (various witnesses). Veterans' and fraternal organizations mounted a successful effort before Congress for the enactment of an
exemption for charitable benefit performances by nonprofit veterans' or fraternal organizations. See Pub. L. No. 97-366, 96 Stat. 1759 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
211 See, e.g., CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 44 (remarks of Cyril F. Brickfield, House
Judiciary Committee).
212 See Litman, supra note 15, at 876-79 and sources cited therein.
213 See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Forward: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-18 (1984); Landes & Posner, supra note
8, at 877; Macey, supra note 8, at 227-33; Posner, supra note 8, at 265-68.
214 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 8, at 232-33.
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them endorsed, Congress would refrain from exercising independent judgment on the substance of the legislation.2 15
The nature of this bargain introduces particular difficulties into
the enterprise of statutory interpretation. As I have argued elsewhere, this type of drafting process makes it exceedingly difficult to
speak of legislative intent if by legislative intent one means the substantive intent of members of Congress.2 16 But, even if one avoids
that dilemma by ascribing to Congress an intent to enact the substance of the deals forged in conferences, one nonetheless may encounter difficulty in identifying any overall purpose pervading the
text of the statute. 2 17 The compromises that evolve through the
conference process can be multilateral and interrelated, but may not
incorporate any common vision or strategy.21 8 Courts must apply
this legislation to parties, works, and situations that never arose
during the conference process, and to industries that could not be
21 9
present.
In the 1976 Act's first decade, for example, courts struggled with
cases involving videocassette recorders, 220 communications satellites, 2 2 ' and on-line databases.22 2 The courts' efforts to apply the
See Litman, supra note 15, at 870-80; Olson, supra note 2, at 120.
See Litman, supra note 15, at 863-70.
217 See, e.g., Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 819-20 (1983).
218 It would be exceedingly difficult, for example, to identify a coherent strategy ani215
2 16

mating the assorted provisions of the 1909 Act, see supra notes 141-59 and accompanying text, or any of the versions of the Vestal bill reported out of committee, see supra
notes 116-18 and accompanying text. It is easier to discern a scheme underlying the
provisions of the 1976 Act, see infra notes 230-60 and accompanying text, but the
scheme that emerges seems to me to be neither workable nor wise. See infra notes 31315, 449-58 and accompanying text.
219 Courts have not, for the most part, attempted to detect an overarching strategy in
the provisions of the 1976 Act. Many courts have relied on the plain meaning of the
statutory language of whatever provisions are in dispute. See, e.g., Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); Pacific & Southern Co. v. Satellite Broadcast Networks, 694
F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Courts' use of the plain meaning rule arguably increases the influence of linguistic fortuity on the results. See infra notes 373-96 and
accompanying text. Other courts have relied heavily on case law interpreting the 1909
Act. See cases cited in Litman, supra note 15, at 859-61, 896-901. Reversion to early
case law has introduced additional randomness into courts' interpretations of the statute. See id. at 903. If courts were to interpret the statute with an eye to enforcing its
underlying strategy, however, it seems likely that courts would hold many more activities than they have to be infringing. See infra notes 406-18 and accompanying text. As a
result, the 1976 Act would age even more rapidly than it has thus far.
220 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see
infra notes 406-16 and accompanying text.
221 See Hubbard Broadcasting v. Southern Satellite Systems, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.

HeinOnline -- 68 Or. L. Rev. 315 1989

316

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68, 1989]

statute in these cases have been widely criticized. 223 The statutory
language, however, gives courts little guidance. The fact-specific
provisions of the statute do not contemplate such exotic creatures; 224 the paucity of provisions articulating more general princi225
ples has relegated courts to ad hoc decisionmaking.
Moreover, the complexity and specificity of multiparty compromises exacerbates the problem. If a compromise is negotiated
between monolithic interests, between, for example, all artists and
all art users, we can find roughly defined privies in the negotiating
process for the interests that develop in the future. Applying a
compromise negotiated among encyclopedia publishers, popular
music composers, motion picture producers, novelists, and dramatists, however, to a situation involving the importers of unicorn figurines22 6 can be substantially more troublesome. This reveals the
difficulty of jettisoning any effort to find coherence in such a statute
and attempting to interpret it as if it were a contract.2 27 If the industry to which a court is trying to apply the statute was neither
represented in negotiations nor in privity with someone who was
there, it is difficult to assess how the metaphorical contract allocates
the risks of ambiguity.
As it happens, however, the conferences that led to the 1976 Act
did finally settle on a common strategy and did allocate the risks of
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986); Eastern Microwave v. Doubleday Sports, 691
F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); infra notes 376-96 and
accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., West Publishing v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
223 See, e.g., Adelstein & Perez, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for
Ideas. Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. OF L. & EcON.
209 (1985); Kost, supra note 4, at 24-25; Oman, The 1976 Copyright Revision Revisited:
"Lector, si monumentum requiris, circumspice," 34 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 29, 32, 35
(1986); Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 53-58
(1987).
224 The fact that the statute fails to make explicit provision for video cassette recorders and communications satellites highlights how very shortsighted the negotiation process has tended to be. Both were foreseeable developments at the time of the drafting
process, but had not yet posed concrete problems for affected industries, and consequently received no attention.
225 See infra notes 341-416 and accompanying text.
226 See Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (1987) (discussing Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
982 (1984)).
227 Some commentators have suggested that special interest legislation should be interpreted and enforced as if it were a contract between interest groups and the legislature or among interest groups. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 213, at 18.
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ambiguity. Indeed, industry representatives explained the strategy
to Congress in unusually explicit terms. The bills that became the
1976 Act possessed a coherence that previous revision legislation
lacked, although that coherence emerged as a byproduct of the efforts to achieve inter-industry consensus. Register Kaminstein suggested early on that the key to general revision would be to draft a
copyright bill that benefited each of the competing interests.2 2 8 In
that, the conferences succeeded. The bill that emerged from the
conferences enlarged the copyright pie and divided its pieces among
229
conference participants so that no leftovers remained.
C. Broad Rights and Narrow Exceptions
In 1961, two months after Register Kaminstein filed the controversial Register's Report, he convened a meeting of an augmented
panel to discuss copyright revision. Kaminstein invited the original
twenty-nine panelists, chairmen of bar association committees, delegations from a dozen federal agencies and departments, and representatives of several interests that had until then been excluded.23 °
Kaminstein announced that the purpose of the meeting was for the
assembled government and industry representatives to use the recommendations made in the Register's Report as the foundation for
the development of inter-industry consensus. 2 31 The meeting was
the first of a series; the series of meetings spawned further series of
meetings; with each meeting the number of interests represented on
the panel increased.2 3 2 Between panel meetings, the panelists met
with one another in search of compromises, and the Copyright Office urged further meetings and negotiations among affected interests.23 3 During the many meetings, the Copyright Office and
228 See REGISTER'S 1961 REPORT, supra note 196, at 71.
229 This interpretation of the bill is not explicitly reflected on the face of the statute,
or in the House and Senate Committee Reports. The evolution of the language of the
bill through the process of negotiations, however, reveals broadening rights, narrowing
exceptions, and redrafting of statutory language to close perceived loopholes open to
future exploitation. The negotiation process encouraged each subsequent draft to treat
absent interests less generously than its predecessor. See infra notes 230-312 and accompanying text.
230 See CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 1-4. Two congressional staffers also attended as
observers. See id.
231 See id. at 4-5; see also id. at 4 (remarks of Rutherford D. Rogers, Chief Assistant
Librarian of Congress) ("We are in the unenviable position of being the middle man
here trying to reconcile the interests of special groups as well as the public interest.").
232 Compare, e.g., id. at 55-56 with CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 33-36.
233 See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 204, at 93-94 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein, Former Register of Copyrights); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R.
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industry representatives hammered out the substance of a revision
bill.

23 4

In the 1961 Register's Report, the Copyright Office suggested
only modest changes in the law: the codification of courts' solutions
to assorted copyright problems, the clarification and simplification
of language, and the removal of some anomalies created by technological change or historical accident. 235 Meetings with representatives of affected interests, however, produced proposals to broaden
rights 2 36 and narrow exemptions and privileges.2 37 Suggestions for
broad or general privileges evolved through negotiations to very
specific ones.2 38
4347 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1965) [hereinafter 1965
House Hearings] (prepared testimony of George Cary, Deputy Register of Copyrights);
id. at 994 (prepared testimony of Motion Picture Ass'n of America); 113 CONG. REC.
8586 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
234 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents Trademarksand Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 64 (1965) [Hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
235 See CLR PART 1, supra note 196; CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 19 (remarks of
George Cary, Deputy Register of Copyrights). See generally Ringer, First Thoughts on
the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477, 484-90 (1977).
236 See, e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 61 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors'
League of America); CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 109-17, 184-86 (colloquy); CLR
PART 2, supra note 6, at 247-62 (written comments of Authors' League of America,
Inc.).
237 See, e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 58-59 (remarks of Edward Sargoy,
ABA); id. at 96 (remarks of Phillip Wattenberg, Music Publishers' Ass'n); id. at 105
(remarks of Sidney M. Kaye, BMI); CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 168-69 (remarks of
Bella Linden).
238 For example, a proposal for a broad exemption for educational institutions
evolved into a request for a narrow photocopying privilege. Representatives of educational institutions were included on the panel, but sat through early panel meetings with
few comments. See CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 42 (remarks of William Fidler,
American Ass'n of University Professors). Others suggested a broad exemption for
nonprofit use. See, e.g., id. at 223 (written comments of Eugene Aleinikoff). When it
appeared that the panel was unlikely to endorse a nonprofit exemption, representatives
of educators proposed a broad educational exemption. See CLR PART 3, supra note
203, at 150-51 (remarks of Harry N. Rosenfield). Confronted with intense opposition
from publishers of textbooks, the panelists drafted a narrower, conditional educational
exemption. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIM-

INARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 217-25 (Comm. Print 1964)
[hereinafter CLR PART 4] (remarks of Harry N. Rosenfield, Nat'l Education Ass'n);
CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 222-23 (written comments of Ad Hoc Committee of
Educational Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision). By the time
of the first congressional hearings on the revision bill, educators focused their request on
a privilege for limited educational photocopying. See 1965 Senate Hearings,supra note
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For example, the performance right developed through the conferences into something much broader than the Register had initially proposed, with much narrower exceptions. The 1909 Act
gave the owner of the copyright in a musical work the exclusive
right to perform the work publicly for profit, subject to the jukebox
exemption. 239 A 1952 amendment extended the right of public performance for profit to lectures, sermons, and other nondramatic literary works. 240 Dramatic works had had a public performance
right without a for-profit limitation since 1856, while motion pictures had no explicit performance right at all.24 1 The Register's
1961 Report recommended that musical and nondramatic literary
works continue to have a public performance for profit right and
that motion pictures be given a public performance right with no
for-profit qualification.2 42 Representatives of authors and composers, however, insisted that the for-profit limitation be discarded;2 4 3
composers and motion picture producers argued for a broader definition of public performance.24 4 The Copyright Office drafted a
provision granting copyright owners the exclusive right to perform
the work publicly, subject to express exceptions for educational and
religious performances, charitable benefits, and retransmissions of
television and radio broadcasts.24 5
The response from the panelists was guardedly positive; they
shifted their emphasis to requesting that the exceptions be radically
narrowed.2 4 6 Representatives of industries that performed copyrighted works were willing to go along so long as the exemptions
and privileges set forth in the bill continued to address their con234, at 85 (testimony of Harold Wigren, Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions
and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision).
239 See supra note 62.
24°See supra note 173.

See generally CLR PART 1, supra note 196, at 22-23, 27-32.
See id. at 27-32. The Register also recommended the repeal of the jukebox exemption. Id.
243 See, e.g., CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 286-88 (written comments of Herman
Finklestein); CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 135-36 (remarks of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register for Examining).
244 See, e.g., CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 404-07 (written comments of John F.
Whicher); CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 148 (remarks of Herman Finklestein, ASCAP); see also id. at 155 (remarks of Douglas Anello, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
245 See CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 4-14 (Preliminary Draft §§ 5(c), 8, 13); id. at
135-40 (remarks of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register for Examining).
246 See, e.g, id. at 149 (remarks of Herman Finklestein, ASCAP); id. at 152-53 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors' League of America); id. at 241 (remarks of James A.
Stabile, Nat'l Broadcasting Co.).
241

242
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cerns. 2 1 Industry representatives got together in meetings sponsored by the Copyright Office or subcommittees of the bar
associations and tried to come to terms on the scope of exceptions
to the performance right.
In 1964, the Copyright Office circulated a draft bill with a more
expansive definition of public performance and further restrictions
24 8
and conditions on specifically worded exemptions and privileges.
Panelists insisted that the exemptions and privileges were still too
broad, general, and ambiguous.2 4 9 Claimants of privileges and exemptions complained that the language of the bill was still unclear. 250 Another round of meetings produced an even more
conditional and restrictively worded series of exemptions and privileges. By the time the 1965 bill was ready for Congressional hearings, the broadly defined public performance right had become
encumbered with specifically worded conditional exceptions for
classroom teaching, educational television transmissions within educational institutions, religious services, charitable benefits, cable
retransmissions at no charge, transmission to private hotel rooms,
and reception of broadcasts in public places. 251 By the time Congress enacted a revision bill in 1976, these exceptions and privileges
had grown still more numerous, more narrowly worded, and more
detailed.2 52
That pattern of evolution pervaded the revision bill. Copyright
owners wanted the broadest possible rights with the narrowest possible exceptions.2 53 Many representatives of interests that used
247 See, e.g., id. at 145 (remarks of Eugene N. Aleinikoff, National Educational Television and Radio Center); id. at 241-44 (remarks of George Schiffer, Schiffer & Cohen);
id. at 433 (written comments of George Schiffer).
24
8 See CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 4-9 (S. 3008, §§ 5, 6, 8, 12, 13); id. at 94-96
(remarks of Abe Goldman, Copyright Office General Counsel).
249 See, e.g., id. at 59 (remarks of Edward A. Sargoy, ABA); id. at 96 (remarks of
Phillip B. Wattenberg); id. at 105 (remarks of Sidney M. Kaye, BMI); id. at 224-25
(written comments of American Book Publishers' Council and American Textbook
Publisher's Institute).
250 See id. at 60, 75 (remarks of George Schiffer, National Community Television
Ass'n); id. at 64-65 (remarks of Eugene N. Aleinikoff, Nat'l Education Television and
Radio Center).
251 See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109 (1965).
252 Compare H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109 (1965) with S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. §§ 110, 111, 116, 118 (1976).
253 See, e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 58-59 (remarks of Edward Sargoy,
ABA); id. at 78-80 (colloquy); id. at 233 (written remarks of American Textbook Publishers' Institute); CLR PART 4, supra note 238, at 316 (written comments of Authors'
League of America); id. at 323 (written comments of Joshua Binion Cahn); CLR PART
3, supra note 203, at 112 (remarks of Herman Finklestein, ASCAP); id. at 112-14 (re-
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copyrighted works were agreeable to such a strategy on the condition that such exceptions explicitly cover their activities.25 4 In addition, some insisted that the product of their use of pre-existing
copyrighted works itself be copyrightable and entitled to the expansive rights.2"5 Thus, the field of copyrightable subject matter grew
progressively more inclusive.25 6 The Copyright Office had committed itself to seeking a consensus solution, and consensus jelled
around a strategy of granting broad rights in an expansive field of
copyrightable works and subjecting the rights to specific, narrowly
tailored exceptions.25 7
marks of Edward A. Sargoy, ABA); id. at 130-31 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors'
League of America).
254 See, e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 60 (remarks of George Schiffer, Nat'l
Community Television Ass'n); id. at 77 (remarks of Douglas A. Anello, Nat'l Ass'n of
Broadcasters); CLR PART 4, supra note 238, at 54 (remarks of Raymond G. Larocca,
Midwest Program on Airborne Television); CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 127, 145
(remarks of Eugene N. Aleinikoff, Nat'l Television Educ. and Radio Center); id. at 158
(remarks of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register for Examining); id. at 198-99 (remarks
of Douglas Anello, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
255 See, e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 78-80 (colloquy); CLR PART 3, supra
note 203, at 322-23 (remarks of Eugene N. Aleinikoff, Nat'l Educ. Television and Radio
Center); CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 13 (remarks of Thomas J. Robinson, Motion
Picture Ass'n of America).
256 The Register's 1961 Report recommended retaining the 1909 Act's approach to
copyrightable subject matter by specifying classes of copyrightable works. The Register
suggested specifying all classes mentioned in the 1909 Act, plus any others Congress
chose to add, but describing them in somewhat broader language to permit the development of new forms of traditionally copyrightable works. See CLR PART 1, supra note
196, at 11. Conference participants preferred a more general approach. See, e.g., CLR
PART 3, supra note 203, at 46-59 (colloquy). The 1965 revision bill defined copyrightable subject matter broadly, declaring that copyright subsisted "in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible means of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102
(1965). Accompanying the declaration was a nonexclusive list of categories of works of
authorship. The law enacted in 1976 retained the quoted language with a slightly augmented list of categories. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The scope of copyrightable subject
matter extends copyright protection to most creations fixed in tangible form, including
television and radio programs, toys, sound recordings, computer software and video
games. The Register of Copyrights anticipated that enactment of the new statute would
increase copyright registrations significantly. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF
THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1976, reprinted in 3 N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC
RECORD 316-17 (1978).
257 See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings,supra note 233, at 1858-59 (testimony of Abraham
Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights); CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 56-58 (remarks of
Abe Goldman, Copyright Office General Counsel). Some of my colleagues would quarrel with my characterization of broad rights subject to narrow exceptions. Professor
Jane Ginsburg, for example, argues that the fact that the performance and display rights
granted by the statute are limited to public performance and display makes those rights
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The bill introduced in Congress in 1965 followed this scheme. In
the first of a long series of congressional hearings on copyright revision, Deputy Register George Cary explained the bill's approach:
The problem of balancing existing interests is delicate enough,
but the bill must do something even more difficult. It must try
and foresee and take account of changes in the forms of use and
the relative importance of the competing interests in the years to
come, and it must attempt to balance them fairly in a way that
carries out the basic constitutional purpose of the copyright law.
Obviously, no one can foresee accurately and in detail the
evolving patterns in the ways authors' work will reach the public
10, 20, or 50 years from now. Lacking that kind of foresight, the
bill adopts a general approach of providing compensation to the
author for future as well as present uses of his work that materially affect the value of his copyright. As shown by the jukebox
exemption in the present law, a particular use which may seem to
have little or no economic impact on the author's rights today
can assume tremendous importance in times to come. A real
danger to be guarded against is that of confining the scope of an
author's rights on the basis of the present technology, so that as
the years go by his copyright loses much of its value because of
unforeseen technical advances.
For these reasons the bill reflects our belief that authors' rights
should be stated in the statute in broad terms and that the spefurther than is shown
cific limitations on them should not go25any
8
to be necessary in the public interest.
Thus, a strategy born by accident of accretion had acquired its rationale. The revision bill spelled out five expansively defined exclusive rights: the right to reproduce or copy the work, the right to
make derivative works or adapt the work, the right to distribute the
work, the right to perform the work publicly, and the right to display the work publicly.25 9 It then subjected the exclusive rights to a
narrow indeed in an era of widespread private use. Ginsburg also suggests that the
statute's incorporation of the first sale and fair use doctrines, see infra notes 338-70 and
accompanying text, represents very broad limitation of the copyright owner's bundle of
rights. See also Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled
Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 593-94 (1985) (describing exemptions from perform-

ance and display rights set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 110 as "the pork-barrel exemptions").
Professors Ginsburg and Brown would, I believe, nonetheless agree that the grant of
rights in the 1976 Act is far broader, and that the statutory exceptions are more narrowly worded, than their counterparts in the 1909 Act and the early drafts of a revision
bill.
258 1965 House Hearings, supra note 233, at 32-33 (prepared testimony of George
Cary, Deputy Register of Copyrights).
259 See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1965).
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variety of narrowly drawn exceptions.26
D.

Ongoing Negotiations and Narrower Solutions

Not all of the disputes were resolved through the prelegislative
process. When Congress held its first hearings on the revision bill in
the tenth year of the revision program, several controversies remained,2 6 1 and more disputes arose as the rapid pace of technological change created new players and new problems. 6 2 Significantly,
however, none of the unresolved controversies concerned the overall structure and approach of the bill. 263 Almost all of the disputes
involved specific details of particular privileges and exemptions. 6 4
Members of Congress declined, for the most part, to respond to the
controversies by attempting to arrive at policy solutions of their
own devising. Instead, Congress involved itself in the mediation
process, urging opposing interests to meet, cajoling them to reach
agreement, and sometimes sitting down with them and demanding
that they compromise.26 5 During the eleven additional years that it
260See id. §§ 107-114. Compare the greater variety of even more narrowly drawn
exceptions in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118.
261 See 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 234, at 68-72 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
262 The entry of computer programs and computer databases into the arena, for example, significantly complicated already difficult disputes. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 210, at 192-201 (testimony of Arthur Miller, Ad Hoc Committee of
Educ. Insts. and Orgs. on Copyright Law Revision); 1965 House Hearings, supra note
233, at 74-79 (testimony of Len Deighton, American Textbook Publishers Inst.).
263 See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 233, at 1857-73 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
264 According to Register Kaminstein, the controversies that remained unresolved as
of the 1965 Hearings were the fate of the jukebox exemption, the scope of privileges or
exemptions to be provided for education and educational broadcasting, the scope of
privileges or exemptions for cable television, the statutory rate for the compulsory license for mechanical reproductions of music, and the retention of the manufacturing
clause, which required some books to be printed from type set within the United States.
See 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 234, at 68-72. All but the last of these disputes
involved the conditions under which uses of copyrighted material would be privileged
or exempt. The parties ultimately settled the jukebox, public television, and cable television disputes by agreeing to establish new compulsory licenses. The rate dispute for
the mechanical compulsory license settled when the parties agreed to let it be decided by
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, an agency invented to administer the three new compulsory licenses. Interested parties resolved the manufacturing clause dispute with a
complicated agreement to limit the scope and duration of the domestic typesetting requirement and reduce the penalties for noncompliance. The Register of Copyrights
disapproved of the substance of all of these agreements, but nonetheless recommended
that Congress enact them. See Litman, supra note 15, at 869-78 and sources cited
therein.
265 Litman, supra note 15, at 871-79; see also 1975 House Hearings, supra note 204, at
237-38 (testimony of Townsend Hoopes, Ass'n of American Publishers); id. at 363 (re-
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took to produce a bill that every industry representative would be
willing to support, the solutions to inter-industry disputes became
progressively more complicated and detailed.
1. Reproduction by Broadcastersand Libraries
For example, the 1965 bill included a provision permitting broadcasters licensed to perform a work to make a single ephemeral recording of the work.2 66 The privilege, included at broadcasters'
insistence as a condition for supporting the expanded performance
right,2 67 to which it had no direct relation, would have allowed a
broadcaster to make a temporary tape of a copyrighted work for
convenience in broadcasting the work. Thus, a radio station could
have taped a program of copyrighted songs, broadcast the songs,
and then destroyed the tape or retained it solely for archival purposes.2 6 ' After testimony revealing that the privilege was controversial, the House Judiciary Committee reported out a version of
the privilege that excluded motion pictures, imposed further limitations and conditions on the use of the recording, and prohibited the
copyrighting of the recording without the consent of the owner of
the copyright in the underlying work.2 69 In 1969, the Senate expanded the privilege for educational broadcasters, but not other
broadcasters, in order to permit up to twelve ephemeral recordings
and delay their destruction for up to five years. 2 70 Later, Congress
expanded the twelve recordings to thirty, lengthened the five years
marks of Rep. Drinan); id. at 890-91 (testimony of Eric Smith, Public Broadcasting
Sys.); id. at 971 (testimony of Edward Cramer, BMI); id. at 1840, 1847 (testimony of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); 1965 House Hearings,supra note 233, at 591
(remarks of Rep. Poll); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1969, reprinted in 2 N. HENRY, supra
note 256, at 154; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1968, reprintedin 2 N. HENRY, supra note

256, at 3-4; 122 CONG. REC. 3824 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Hollings); id. at 31,980-81
(remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 31,985 (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 113 CONG.
REC. 8585, 8592 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
266See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110 (1965).
267 See, e.g., CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 127 (remarks of Eugene N. Aleinikoff,
Nat'l Educ. Television and Radio Center); id. at 198-99 (remarks of Douglas Anello,
Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
268 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION

BILL 44-47 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter CLR PART 6].
269 See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1966); H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1966).
270
See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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to seven years, added a separate privilege with its own conditions
for distribution of an ephemeral recording of religious music, and
finally, incorporated a distinct ephemeral recording privilege (limited to ten copies with no firm destruction date) for nonprofit educational broadcasts of nondramatic literary works to blind or deaf
audiences.2 7 '
Also unsettled at the time of the initial congressional hearings
was the issue of library photocopying. The 1961 Register's Report
proposed that the statute permit nonprofit libraries to supply their
patrons with single photocopies of articles or out-of-print books.27 2
It proved impossible to reconcile the positions of authors, publishers, and librarians during the conferences. The Copyright Office
drafted an elaborate provision setting forth the conditions under
which libraries could make photocopies; authors, publishers, and
library groups demanded its deletion.2 7 3 Thus, the bill introduced
in Congress contained no provision addressing library copying. At
the request of historians and archivists, the House subcommittee
added a provision in 1967 permitting nonprofit institutions to make
archival copies of unpublished works. During the next round of
hearings, library associations pressed for their own express exemption.2 74 The Senate subcommittee expanded the archival privilege
into a complicated provision permitting libraries to reproduce
works or portions of works under specific conditions and restrictions.2 75 In 1974, the Senate added additional conditions and restrictions. The 1974 provision specified the kinds of libraries
entitled to the privilege, the nature of the works that could be reproduced, the amount of the works that could be copied, the number of
copies that could be made, and the extent of the investigation the
library must undertake before making any reproductions in an asSee H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-05, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
5715-20.
at 25-26.
273 See CLR PART 6, supra note 268, at 26. Authors and publishers argued that the
provision would legalize copying prohibited under current law and, thus, open the door
to wholesale abuse. Librarians argued that the provision would prohibit copying legal
under current law and, thus, curtail established services and impede legitimate scholarship. See id.
274
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (DRAFT) SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF
271

CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 5659,
272 See CLR PART 1, supra note 196,

THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW: 1975 REVISION BILL 57-103 (1975) [hereinafter REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
275 See S. 543, 91st

Cong., 1st Sess. § 108 (1969).
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sortment of situations.27 6
While authors, publishers, and libraries sought to reach an agreement, 2 "1 the House added some refinements of its own, including
provisions to treat interlibrary loans more explicitly and to require
the Register of Copyrights to prepare periodic reports to Congress
on the section's practical success.27 8 Efforts to mediate the continuing dispute finally bore fruit on the day the House passed the 1976
bill and referred it to the conference committee. Organizations representing authors, publishers, and libraries agreed to accept the provision passed by the House, as interpreted by a series of complicated
guidelines on which they had concurred. The guidelines specified
further conditions and restrictions, adopted definitions of disputed
statutory language, and imposed record keeping requirements. The
conference committee approvingly incorporated the guidelines in
2 79
the Conference Report.
2.

Cable Television

Another, even more complex example is the way the bill accommodated cable television. When the cable television issue first surfaced in the conferences,28 ° the cable television industry had just
begun commercial development. In the 1950s and early 1960s,
cable operators erected community antenna systems that amplified
and transmitted broadcast signals to private homes in communities
unable to receive satisfactory television signals by conventional
276See S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 108 (1974). Register Ringer's report to the
House subcommittee in 1975 described the amended Senate provision this way:
Note that the conditions set out in subsection (a) are only a general starting
point. For a library activity to be exempt, it must also qualify under one of the
conditions laid out in subsections (b) through (f) and must not run afoul of
subsection (g) and must involve copying of a work that is not mentioned in
subsection (h).
REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 274, at 74.
277 See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 204, at 193 (testimony of Edmon Low, Representative of six Library Associations); id. at 219 (testimony of Irwin Karp, Authors'
League of America); id. at 225 (testimony of Charles Lieb, Ass'n of American Publishers); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
103 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Edmon Low, American
Library Ass'n).
278
See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 271, at 74-79, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5688-92.
279 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-74 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS 5810, 5811-15.
280 See CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 238-41 (remarks of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register for Examining).
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means. Under the 1909 Act, whether cable retransmissions triggered copyright liability depended upon whether the retransmissions would be deemed a "public performance," at that juncture an
unsettled question. 28' As the conferences struggled to redefine the
exclusive performance right, panelists had to confront the issue of
cable television's liability. Cable television companies argued that
the copyright law should exempt their community antenna systems
from its coverage. Broadcasters and copyright owners2 82 insisted
that community antenna operators were collecting fees for cable
service, and should not be able to use copyrighted material free of
charge. In addition, they argued, the proliferation of community
antenna systems discouraged the development of UHF stations
within the community antenna systems' service areas. The Copyright Office devoted much energy to trying to promote agreement.2 83 Compromise proved elusive, however, because the ground
kept shifting in response to technological and regulatory developments and judicial decisions.
In the 1965 bill, the Copyright Office included a provision that
exempted cable retransmissions if made without charge and without
any alteration of the broadcast signal content or transmission of
original programming. 284 Any other retransmission exposed the
cable operator to copyright liability. Meanwhile, however, microwave transmission technology had developed, enabling cable systems to import television signals from distant cities to augment
available programming. Broadcasters began to perceive cable as a
281 The Supreme Court ultimately determined that cable retransmission was public,
but was not a performance. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390
(1968).
282 Broadcasters did not then and do not now, as a rule, own the copyright in the
programs that they broadcast. Independent producers create the programs and secure
licenses from underlying copyright owners. The producers then lease the programs to
network or non-network broadcasting companies for a fee that, typically, does not cover
the expenses of producing the program. After broadcasting the programs under the
terms of the lease, the network has no further rights in the programs, and the producers
can then try to make up the rest of their costs and perhaps make a profit by reselling the
programs to others. In addition to the fee paid to the program's producers, broadcasters pay a separate royalty entitling them to perform any copyrighted music incorporated in the program. Thus, the most significant copyright owners in television
programs are the producers of the programs and the composers of the music in the
programs. However, broadcasters do own the copyright in programs, such as news programs, that they produce in-house.
283 See CLR PART 6, supra note 268, at 40-43.
284 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109(5) (1966); see CLR PART 6, supra note 268,
at 40-43.
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serious threat. Also, during this time, a motion picture studio
brought the first copyright infringement suit against a cable television system for unauthorized retransmissions of the studio's movies.
On both sides of the controversy, parties' positions hardened. In
the House and Senate hearings, broadcasters and copyright owners
argued that all cable television was copyright infringement; cable
companies insisted that they were entitled to a complete exemption
28 5
from copyright liability for retransmissions.
While the congressional committees struggled with the problem,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had already entered the dispute in order to protect broadcasters from the competition it perceived that cable television threatened. The FCC
promulgated regulations requiring cable systems to carry signals of
all local television stations and greatly restricting the importation of
distant signals. 286 Two months later, a district court in the Southern District of New York held a cable system liable for copyright
infringement on the ground that its retransmission of local television signals was a public performance for profit.2 87 The Copyright
Office continued to urge the parties to negotiate an agreement, and
the FCC added its voice of encouragement. Representative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee, proposed a compromise provision, while the Senate subcommittee scheduled special
hearings to consider the cable television issue. Under the Kastenmeier provision, transmission of local signals with no alteration
would be exempt from copyright liability. 28 8 Transmission of im-

ported distant signals would expose the cable operator either to full
liability or to limited liability, depending on variables such as the
reception of broadcast signals in the community and the presence
within the local service area of a broadcast station licensed to carry
the programs in the imported signal.2 8 9
The Kastenmeier proposal received more opposition than support. 29' Representatives of cable television companies presented
285 See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings,supra note 233, at 1243-55 (testimony of Frederick
Ford, Nat'l Community Television Ass'n); id. at 1288-90 (testimony of Thomas J.
Whyte, West Virginia and Middle Atlantic Community Television Ass'n); id. at 133253 (testimony of Arthur Krim, United Artists Corp.); id. at 1722-24 (testimony of
Douglas Anello, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
286
See United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1968).
287 United Artists Television v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
affid, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
288 See H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-88 (1966).
2 89
See id. at 85-87.
2 90
See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 274, at 121-22;
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their own compromise proposals, which exempted local signals,
provided a compulsory license entitling cable operators to import
any distant signal for a statutory fee, and released cable operators
from the obligation to pay any royalties for the performance of
copyrighted music. 29 t The House Judiciary Committee adopted the
Kastenmeier proposal rather than the cable industry's request for a
compulsory license and reported the copyright revision bill incorporating the provision to the full House. 292 Acrimonious debate ensued over the cable provision. After intense, last minute
negotiation, the House adopted an amendment deleting the cable
provision entirely before passing the bill and referring it to the Senate. 293 Parties resumed their negotiations, but the ground soon
shifted again.
In 1967, the Supreme Court agreed to review lower court decisions subjecting cable television operators to copyright liability, and
efforts to reach agreement stalled in the expectation of judicial resolution. The following year, the Court issued a decision reversing
the lower courts' determination that cable retransmissions of local
signals was copyright infringement; the Court held that cable retransmissions did not "perform" the copyrighted work within the
meaning of the 1909 copyright statute.2 94 In another decision, the
295
Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction to regulate cable television;
the FCC responded by imposing more stringent regulations prohibiting the importation of distant signals into major television markets
without prior permission from the originating stations.2 96 Under
these conditions, representatives of broadcasters and cable television companies finally negotiated an agreement in 1969,297 but the
National Association of Broadcasters proved unable to persuade its
membership to ratify it. 298 The Senate, nonetheless, used some of
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL

YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1967, reprinted in 2 N. HENRY, supra note 256, at 1-2.
291 See Copyright Law Revision-CA TV: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 86-89 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Frederick Ford,
Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n); id. at 248-52 (written comments of Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.)
29 2
See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
29 3
See 113 CONG. REC. 8990-9022 (1967); REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT, supra note 274, at 122.
294 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
295 United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
29 6
See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 274, at 124-26.
29 7

29 8

See id. at 127.

See id. at 128.
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the provisions in the aborted 1969 agreement as the basis for its own
compromise provision, establishing a compulsory license for cable
retransmissions of local and distant signals under conditions established in the private agreement.2 9 9
The FCC, however, had in the interim been formulating its own
new approach. 3" The FCC announced a plan of its own, which
interested parties found completely unacceptable.3"' At this point,
the FCC and the Senate Committee invited Clay Whitehead, director of the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, to become involved in the effort to move private negotiations forward.3 °2
Whitehead's initial efforts at mediation were unsuccessful. Eventually, however, he came up with a proposal and presented it to the
interested parties on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Whitehead's plan
contemplated a compulsory license for such cable television retransmissions as the FCC's regulations permitted, but envisioned the
FCC's using the regulations to protect programmers' exclusivity
from competition by imported signals. In essence, the copyright
owners would agree to cede control of their programs' retransmissions in return for a statutory compensation for cable use and on the
condition that the FCC's regulations protect copyright owners and
broadcasters from cable importation of signals that duplicated their
programs. The parties grudgingly accepted the "consensus agreement," as it came to be called, and the FCC then promulgated regulations permitting cable systems to import distant signals under the
agreement's terms.3" 3
Before the Senate could act on the consensus agreement, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Teleprompter Corp. v.
299

See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1969).

300 See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE

30, 1970, reprintedin 2 N.

HENRY,

supra note 256, at 156-

57.
301 The FCC proposed a plan permitting importation of a limited number of independent (non-network-affiliated) commercial signals, and an unlimited number of
Public Broadcasting System signals, in return for a healthy fee to be used as a subsidy
for PBS. Cable operators located in areas that did not receive all three network signals
would also have been permitted to import a distant signal affiliated with the absent
network. A particularly bizzare feature of the proposal required cable systems to delete
advertisements from commercial distant signals and substitute advertisements provided
by local broadcast stations. Nobody liked this proposal except the Public Broadcasting
Corporation, and the FCC never implemented it.
302 See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 274, at 134; 1973
Senate Hearings,supra note 277, at 278-80 (prepared statement of Jack Valenti, Motion
Picture Ass'n of America).
30 3
See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 274, at 131-40.
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Columbia Broadcasting System," holding the importation of distant signals to be completely exempt from copyright liability under
the 1909 Act. Cable operators began to disavow the portion of the
consensus agreement that outlined mutually agreeable principles of
copyright revision.3" 5 The Senate Committee nonetheless modified
its copyright bill to incorporate many of the copyright principles
contained in the consensus agreement.30 6 The new provision established a compulsory license for retransmission of local signals and
of distant signals that the FCC's regulations permitted cable systems to import, set statutory fees on the basis of cable systems' gross
receipts, and provided for a Copyright Royalty Tribunal to resolve
controversies among claimants to the royalty payments and to revise the statutory royalty rates in response to changes in conditions
or in applicable FCC regulations. Broadcasters, copyright owners,
and cable operators remained dissatisfied with the provision and
continued their private negotiations. Ultimately, cable operators
and copyright owners reached a different agreement, and the House
incorporated that agreement into the copyright bill that Congress
finally enacted in 1976. 307
Broadcasters were not party to the agreement reflected in the
House bill. 3" 8 As might be expected, that agreement disadvantaged
them in comparison with the provisions of the consensus agreement
incorporated in the Senate bill. Where the Senate bill had established a compulsory license for the broadcast of local signals and
distant network signals, the House bill provided a copyright exemption for local and distant network signal retransmission and retained the compulsory license only for distant non-network signal
retransmission.30 9 Where the Senate bill presumptively entitled net304415 U.S. 394 (1974).
305 See 1975 House Hearings,supra note 204, at 485 (testimony of Rex Bradley, Nat'l
Cable Television); id. at 598-613 (testimony of David Wicks, Community Antenna Television Ass'n); id. at 656-66 (testimony of George Barco, Pennsylvania Community Antenna Ass'n); see also 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 277, at 397-411 (testimony of
David Foster, Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n); id. at 512-55 (testimony of Amos Hostetter, Nat'l Television Ass'n).
306 See S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 111 (1974). The consensus agreement began to
break down almost immediately, and witnesses before both subcommittees disputed
whether the Senate provision accurately incorporated its key provisions.
30 7
See H.R. REP. 1476, supra note 271, at 88-101, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG & ADMIN. NEws at 5702-16.
30 8
See id. at 90, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS at 5705; 122 CONG. REC.

31,979 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 31,984 (remarks of Rep. Railsback).
30 9
See H.R. REP. 1476, supra note 271, at 90, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5704.
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work and local broadcasters to recover royalties from the compulsory license royalty fund, the House bill excluded them from the
pool of royalty claimants.3 1 Where the Senate bill calculated the
statutory royalty as a percentage of gross receipts, the House bill
calculated the royalty on the basis of the number of distant signals
imported by the cable system. 3" 1'
It took eleven years and the combined efforts of the Copyright
Office, the bar associations, the House and Senate Subcommittees,
the FCC, and the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy to force interested parties to reach an agreement on the revision
bill's treatment of cable television. The ultimate provision enacted
contained pieces of the Copyright Office's 1965 revision bill, pieces
of the unratified 1969 agreement between the National Association
of Broadcasters and the National Cable Television Association,
pieces of the 1971 consensus agreement, and pieces of the last minute accord between the National Cable Television Association and
the Motion Picture Association of America. It is the copyright statute's longest provision, and its least comprehensible piece of prose.
It became obsolete before its effective date. 3t 2
Negotiations over the rest of the bill's provisions reflect much the
same story. From the inclusive group conferences, negotiations
evolved into interlocking bilateral and trilateral deals. The deals
themselves worked to the advantage of the interests party to them
and to the comparative disadvantage of others. The longer the negotiations on a particular dispute continued, the narrower and more
specific was the resulting solution.
E.

Flexible Limitations

In 1976 Congress finally enacted the modern copyright statute it
had labored over so long, and the Senate optimistically dissolved its
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights.3" 3 For
310 See id. at 97, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5712.
311 Compare S. REP. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-82 (1975) with H.R. REP. 1476,
supra note 271, at 97-98, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5710-11.
312 See infra notes 373-96 and accompanying text; see also Copyright Issues: Cable
Television and PerformanceRights: Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 House Hearings] (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 2-14 (testimony of Henry Geller, U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
313 See Oversight of the Copyright Office and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarksof the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Mathias).
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those familiar with the struggles to apply the 1909 Act to developing technology, however, the 1976 Act should have seemed
designed to fail the future in predictable ways. Broadly phrased
general provisions have inherent flexibility. Narrow, specific provisions do not. In order to answer the questions that the future will
present, a statute needs flexible language embodying general
principles.
General, flexible statutory language need not confer uncabined
discretion on the courts, nor consign affected industries to case-bycase determinations of liability. Flexible provisions that invoke
principles rather than fact-specific conditions will give courts and
industry actors more guidance, rather than less, as to the statute's
application to situations that arise after the law's enactment. Indeed, it is the language tailored to reflect specific factual conditions
that gives the courts nothing to work with once the predicate facts
have grown outdated.3 14
New players that technological change will introduce into the
game have a particularly compelling need for flexible statutory provisions. The representatives of yet-to-develop technology cannot be
present in a bargaining room filled with current stakeholders. They
must, therefore, rely on such general and flexible provisions as the
statutory scheme includes. The narrower and more specific the
prose is, the less likely it is that a statutory provision will be sufficiently flexible to be responsive to technological change, and the
more quickly the provision will be outdated.
A process that relies upon negotiated bargains among industry
representatives, however, is ill-suited to arrive at general, flexible
limitations. The dynamics of inter-industry negotiations tend to encourage fact-specific solutions to inter-industry disputes. 315 The
participants' frustration with the rapid aging of narrowly defined
rights has inspired them to collaborate in drafting rights more
broadly. No comparable tendency has emerged to inject breadth or
flexibility into the provisions limiting those rights. The only general
limitations reflected in the current copyright statute were devised by
courts in the nineteenth century, before Congress turned to a revision strategy resting upon meetings among affected interests.
3 14

See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (application of 1909 Act to motion
pictures and radio broadcasts); infra notes 373-93 and accompanying text (application
of 1976 Act to satellite technology); accord Copyright and Technological Change, supra
note 2, at 23-29 (testimony of Benjamin Compaign, Harvard University).
3 15
See supra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
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Although these provisions have survived the press of technological
change better than the narrow and specific limitations that pervade
the 1976 Act, they have not been equal to the task of providing the
flexibility necessary to respond to the developments that have arrived with the future.
The courts developed several general limitations on the copyright
owners' bundle of rights in interpreting the 1909 Act and the copyright statutes that preceded it. Four of these court-crafted doctrines
found their way into the revision bill, typically in response to particular disputes.3 16 It is these more general limitations that have born
the brunt of supplying the flexibility that the statute requires to adjust to technological change. The narrow disputes that engendered
these doctrines' inclusion in statutory text, however, have distorted
their application and limited their usefulness. Before discussing the
role of these limitations in adapting to the future, I would like to
describe each doctrine briefly, and explain how it came to be included in the 1976 Act.
1.

Idea/Expression Distinction

The most fundamental of these court-made limitations is the
idea/expression distinction. The doctrine dates back at least to the
1879 case of Baker v. Selden,3 17 in which the Supreme Court held
that a copyright on a book describing a bookkeeping system conferred no exclusive rights in the system itself. Copyright protects
only expression and not the ideas expressed.3"' Where idea and expression are inseparable, copyright law permits others to use as
much of the expression as is necessary to convey the unprotected
idea.3 19 Similarly, copyright does not protect facts, systems, or
methods, but only the form in which they are described.32 ° The
316 Other limitations survived because the statute failed to overrule them expressly.
See, e.g., Cohen, Masking Copyright Decision making: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987). That the statute's few general limiting principles derive from judge-made law is no accident. The legislative process that I
have described is an unlikely source of broad, general limitations. If these doctrines had
been born in the revision process rather than in judicial decisions, they would not have
been general.
317 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
318 E.g., Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931); see OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 62-63.
319 E.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971);
Continental Casualty v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816
(1958).
320 E.g., Rosemont Enterprises, v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966),
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1961 Register's Report began
idea/expression distinction:

with

a

description

of the

Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or
information revealed by the author's work. It pertains to the literary, musical, graphic or artistic form in which the author expresses intellectual concepts. It enables him to prevent others
from reproducing his individual expression without his consent.
But anyone is free to create his own expression of the same concepts, or to make practical use of them,
32 1 as long as he doesn't
copy the author's form of expression.
The revision bill that emerged from the conferences made no
mention of the idea/expression distinction. In the 1967 Senate Subcommittee hearings, however, representatives of educational organizations voiced strong opposition to the broad language of the
subject matter and exclusive rights provisions of the bill, on the
ground that the language could be interpreted to extend protection
to the functional processes embodied in computer software.32 2 Educational organizations proposed a broad restatement of the
idea/expression distinction;3 23 publishers and authors registered
their opposition. 324 The Senate Subcommittee drafted a more narrowly worded provision and inserted it into the section on copyrightable subject matter. 32 ' The Subcommittee added language to
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). See Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A
Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516 (1981);
Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 647 (1982); Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for
Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560 (1982).
321 CLR PART 1, supra note 196, at 3.
322 See 1967Senate Hearings,supra note 210, at 196-200 (testimony of Arthur Miller,
Ad Hoc Committee of Educ. Insts. and Orgs. on Copyright Law Revision); id. at 550
(testimony of Edison Montgomery, Interuniversity Communications Council); id. at
1058-59 (testimony of W. Brown Morton, Interuniversity Communications Council).
323 See id. at 1058 (testimony of W. Morton Brown, Interuniversity Communications
Council). Professors Arthur Miller and Benjamin Kaplan drafted a proposed amendment to section 106:
Provided, however, That nothing in this title shall be construed to give the
owner of copyright the exclusive right to any idea, process, plan or scheme
embodied or described in the copyrighted work or the right to prevent the
preparation of any copy or derivative work that is necessary to the use of any
idea, process, plan, or scheme embodied or described in the copyrighted work
as an incident of such use.
Id.
324 See id. at 1109 (written comments of American Book Publishers' Council); id. at
1155-56 (written comments of Authors' League of America).
325 See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b) (1969):
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
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the Committee Report, explaining that the purpose of the subsection was to clarify the debate over computer programs and "make
clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the
scope of the copyright law." 32' 6
2.

Useful Articles Doctrine

A second longstanding doctrine, prohibiting copyright protection
of utilitarian articles, also derives from Baker v. Selden.3" 7 The
Copyright Office refused to accept utilitarian articles for registration, and courts upheld the determination that utilitarian articles
were ineligible for protection.3 2 8 In a 1954 decision, Mazer v.
Stein,32 9 the Supreme Court took some of the teeth from the limitation by holding that an otherwise copyrightable work incorporated
into a utilitarian design remained copyrightable.3 3 ° As interpreted
by the Copyright Office in succeeding years, the decision permitted
the copyrighting of the nonutilitarian features of utilitarian articles. 33 ' The Copyright Office was flooded with applications for registration of objects of industrial design with ornamental features,
such as jewelry, textiles, toys, and dinnerware.3 3 2 Meanwhile, the
Register urged Congress to enact a bill giving industrial designs sui
generis protection.3 33
Extended discussions with industry representatives during the period preceding the copyright revision effort produced a compromise
in 1957, which dictated the substance of both an ultimately unsucto any idea, plan, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
The provision enacted by Congress omitted the word "plan." See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
326 S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1974). See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 274, at 10.
327 See, e.g., Taylor Instrument v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100-01 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944); Amberg File & Index v. Shea Smith & Co., 82
F. 314, 315 (7th Cir. 1897).
328 See, e.g., Amberg File & Index, 82 F. at 314; Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Hirsch, 34
F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
329 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
330
Id. at 214-15. See Denicola, supra note 180, at 711-17.
331 See CLR PART 1, supra note 196, at 12-16; Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341, 1352-53 (1987); Samuelson, Contu Revisited: The Case
Against Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984
DUKE L.J. 663, 728-36.
332
See CLR PART 1, supra note 196, at 12.
333
See id. at 13.
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cessful sui generis design bill and the copyright revision bill's approach to protection of industrial designs.3 34 The compromise
called for continuing the current level of industrial design protection under the copyright law; the Register obligingly incorporated
the substance of his extant regulations on utilitarian articles into the
revision bill. When the conferences produced provisions greatly
broadening the scope of copyrightable subject matter and expanding
the extent of exclusive rights, the Register added a provision purporting to freeze current law relative to the protection of useful articles.3 35 These provisions were placed in portions of the statute
applicable solely to copyright in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works.33 6 Although other limitations in the statute were drafted to
have general application to particular exclusive rights rather than to
particular classes of works,3 37 the limitations on copyright in useful
articles remained, by accident of placement, relevant only to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.33 8
Both the idea/expression distinction and the useful articles doctrine are subject matter limitations on what aspects of a copyrighted
work may be protected. 339 By excluding ideas, facts, or utilitarian
features from the realm of copyrightable subject matter, the statute
puts them into the public domain, where they may be copied with
impunity. The copyright in a work that is largely factual, for example, may be described as thinner than the copyright in a work that is
entirely fictional. Similarly, the copyright in a functional work is
thinner than the copyright in an entirely ornamental work. 3a " Two
additional general limiting principles made their way into the statute. In contrast to the subject matter limitations, these principles
restrict the extent of the copyright owner's rights rather than the
scope of copyrightable subject matter.
3 34

See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 274, at 194-96;
CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 189-94 (various witnesses).
335 See CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 67 (remarks of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
3 36
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113.
337 See, e.g., id. § 110. But see id. § 114(b) (limitations on exclusive rights in sound
recordings).
338 See, e.g., E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 (D.
Minn. 1985) ("The Court cannot accept defendant's characterization of plaintiff's programs as 'a useful work.' Congress has clearly defined computer programs as 'literary
works.' . . . Accordingly, the limitations placed on the copyrightability of useful articles
by section 101 of the Act are simply not applicable here." (citations omitted)).
339 See Brown, supra note 257, at 581.
340 See, e.g., Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1119, 1120-21 (1986).
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First Sale Doctrine

The third doctrine developed by the courts is the first sale doctrine.34 Under the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner's exclusive control over the public distribution of copies of a work is
exhausted, as to a particular copy of a work, upon the first authorized sale of that copy.3 42 It is the first sale doctrine that permits the
operation of lending libraries and second hand book stores notwithstanding the copyright owner's exclusive right of distribution.
Cases made clear that the first sale doctrine terminated the copyright owner's distribution right with respect to a particular copy;34 3
the 1909 Act incorporated that principle in terms. 3 It was less
clear whether the first sale doctrine had any effect on the rest of the
rights in the copyright bundle.34 5 The majority view appeared to be
that the copyright owner lost any right to display a particular copy
in public along with the distribution right, but retained the rights of
reproduction, adaptation, and public performance for profit.34 6
Two controversies led to the inclusion of a modified first sale doctrine in the copyright revision bill. First, representatives of authors
requested an explicit rental and lending right, which would in essence have repealed the first sale doctrine entirely.34 7 Second, when
the Register responded to requests to redraft a proposal that embodied broader rights with specific exceptions, 348 the Copyright Office draft included an express right of public display for pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works only. No display right appeared in
341 See, e.g., Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 195-97 (1988).
342 See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Harrison v. Maynard,

Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 690-91 (2d Cir. 1894); Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing, 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
343 See, e.g., Fawcett Publications, 46 F. Supp. at 717.
344See 1909 Act, supra note 10, § 27.
345 See Samuelson, supra note 341, at 196-98 & n.84.
346 See, e.g., National Geographic Soc'y v. Classified Geographic, 27 F. Supp. 655 (D.
Mass. 1939). One factor complicating the inquiry was the fact that during the early
part of the century, music publishers licensed the right to perform music as part and
parcel of the sale of copies. The purchaser of sheet music thus bought the right to
perform the music publicly for profit. See Arguments on H.R. 11943 Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-16 (1906), reprinted in 4 E.F. BRYLAWSKI
AND A. GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at pt. F (colloquy). Another complication was the
widely held, but never tested in the courts, view that fair use permitted the owner of a
copy to reproduce it. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 233, at 1497-1510 (testimony of Ralph Dwan, Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co.).
347 See CLR PART 2, supra note 6, at 20-21 (colloquy); id. at 255-57 (written comments of Authors' League of America); id. at 313-14 (written comments of Irwin Karp).
348 See supra notes 236-48 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 68 Or. L. Rev. 338 1989

Copyright Legislation and Technological Change

the 1909 Act, and the 1961 Register's report made no mention of
one.34 9 The Copyright Office's proposal called for a display right
severely limited by the first sale doctrine: the right to display a
copy, which included both display in a public place and television
broadcast or motion picture exhibition, would terminate completely
upon that copy's sale.35 0 Artists' representatives responded with
352
dismay.3"' Book publishers echoed the objections.
The Copyright Office held meetings with artists' and publishers'
representatives and interested ABA members and then drafted a
broad display right subject to a more limited first sale doctrine.35 3
Under the new first sale provision, sale of a copy of a work entitled
the purchaser to resell or lend it and to display it to people located
in the same room. The copyright owner retained the right to television or other remote display.35 4 Moreover, while the privilege codified in the 1909 Act could be exercised by anyone in lawful
possession of a copy, 35 the revision bill's narrower first sale provision applied only to owners of copies and persons acting with the
owners' authority. 3 6 This mollified artists' and publishers' representatives. Authors' representatives initially continued to press for
a public lending right 357 but abandoned their request in view of
other concessions. The display right and the first sale doctrine received some further tinkering in Congress. The display right was
expanded to vest in literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and the individual images of motion pictures or
other audio-visual works, as well as pictorial, graphic, and sculp349 See CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 157 (remarks of Barbara Ringer).
3 50
See id. at 6.
35 See id. at 184-85 (remarks of Harriet Pilpel); CLR PART 4, supra note 238, at 323
(written comments of Joshua Binion Cahn) ("If the proposed provision with respect to
the right to exhibit means what I think it does, I find it repugnant and shocking.").
35 2
See CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at 185-87 (colloquy).
353 See CLR PART 5,supra note 205, at 56-59, 66 (remarks of Abe Goldman and
Barbara Ringer, Copyright Office).
354 See id. at 66 (remarks of Barbara Ringer, Copyright Office).
355 See 1909 Act, supra note 10, § 27 ("[N]othing in this title shall be deemed to
forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of the copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained ....").
356 The 1964 draft of the revision bill restricted the privileges of transfer and display
under the first sale doctrine to owners of lawfully made copies, expressly excluding
renters and borrowers. See CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 5. The Copyright Office's
draft of the 1965 Revision bill extended the privileges to persons authorized by the
purchaser of the copy. See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108 (1965).
357 See CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 61 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors' League
of America).
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tural works. 35 8 Congress revised the first sale doctrine to limit the
display privilege to displays involving the actual copy or the projection of no more than one image at a time.35 9
4. Fair Use
The fourth general limitation was the controversial doctrine of
fair use. Fair use originated as a judicially created, implied limitation on copyright owners' rights. One of its earliest American expressions came in the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh.36 ° Fair use
evolved in the case law into a privilege to use a reasonable portion
of a copyrighted work for a reasonable purpose, but the privilege
eluded precise definition.3 6 1 Defendants commonly invoked the
privilege in cases involving parody, biography, or scholarly research.36 The Copyright Office's study on fair use concluded that
the courts assessed a variety of factors in determining whether an
allegedly infringing use was fair.3 63
The 1961 Register's Report suggested that the revision bill give
explicit recognition to the fair use doctrine.3 " The proposal proved
controversial; conference participants disagreed on the scope of fair
use under extant law and also disagreed on the wisdom of reducing
their understanding to statutory text.3 65 The Copyright Office's efforts to negotiate a compromise before presenting a bill to Congress
failed when the issue of fair use became tangled with the issue of
educational use.366
35

8See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5); S. 543, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 106(5) (1969).
See 17 U.S.C. § 109; H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109 (1967).
360 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). See generally W.F. PATRY, THE
3 59

FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3-64 (1985). Folsom v. Marsh involved a

suit by a biographer of George Washington against a second biographer who had incorporated material from the plaintiffis work in a later biography of Washington.
361 See generally Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

86TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (Comm. Print 1960).

362 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Columbia Pictures v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F.
Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
363 See Latman, supra note 361, at 14-18.
36 4
See CLR PART 1, supra note 196, at 25.
365 See 1965 House Hearings,supra note 233, at 37-40 (prepared statement of George
Cary, Deputy Register of Copyrights); id. at 74-79 (testimony of Lee Deighton, American Textbook Publisher's Inst.); id. at 315-18 (testimony of Harold Wigren, Ad Hoc
Comm. of Educ. Insts. and Orgs. on Copyright Law Revision); id. at 342-44 (prepared
statement of Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc Comm. of Educ. Insts. and Orgs. on Copyright
Law Revision); id. at 364-65 (colloquy); id. at 1451-53 (colloquy).
3 66
See Litman, supra note 15, at 875-77, 886-88.
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Representatives of educational institutions requested a statutory
exemption for educational use.3 67 Authors and publishers refused;
they insisted that educators were already abusing the copyright law
and should receive no further privileges beyond those the fair use
doctrine already permitted.3 6 8 Educators responded that fair use
was too unpredictable a doctrine for them to rely on;369 moreover,
because most fair use cases arose in commercial contexts, they gave
little guidance to the doctrine's application in a nonprofit educational setting. 370 The Register and the House Subcommittee's general counsel convened several series of meetings; members of
Congress urged further negotiations. Ultimately a compromise
emerged, encompassing both the language of a statutory fair use
section and the language of the House and Senate Reports to accompany it. 37 I The resulting statutory provision combined language from the Register's initial proposal with examples of
educational use. The accompanying passages in the House and Senate Reports grew by accretion to include the authors' and publishers' early demand that the goal of the statutory provision was "to
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow or enlarge it in any way"; the educators' demand for an extensive discussion of photocopying for classroom use; and the text of
letters from representatives of affected interests together with exceedingly detailed guidelines on classroom reproduction that the
representatives had negotiated among themselves.3 72
Each of these general limitations originated in judicial opinions of
the nineteenth century. Each appeared in the 1976 Act in response
to particular concerns. The codification process introduced its own
distortions. The useful articles doctrine, for example, ceased to be a
general limitation and became instead a peculiarity of copyright in
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. The fair use doctrine be367 See CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 116 (remarks of Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc
Comm. of Educ. Insts. and Orgs. on Copyright Law Revision); id. at 125 (remarks of
Robert Shafer, Nat'l Council of Teachers of English); CLR PART 3, supra note 203, at
150-51 (remarks of Harry Rosenfield).
368 See CLR PART 5, supra note 205, at 96 (remarks of Phillip Wattenberg, Music
Publishers Ass'n); id. at 103 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors' League of America).
36 9
See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 233, at 351-53 (testimony of Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc Comm. on Copyright Law Revision); id. at 364-65 (colloquy); CLR PART
5, supra note 205, at 98-100 (Statement of Ad Hoc Comm. on Copyright Law Revision).
370 See, e.g., 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 277, at 193 (testimony of Richard J.
Schoeck, Modern Language Ass'n).
371 See Litman, supra note 15, at 876-77.
372 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 271, at 65-74, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5678-88; S. REP. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-67 (1975).
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came encumbered with the idiosyncratic needs of educational users.
These doctrines are, however, the most flexible limitations the statute offers in order to balance its expansive rights and broad subject
matter.
V
THE FUTURE OF THE

1976

ACT

The 1976 Act's strategy has caused it difficulties in adjusting to
technological development. The specificity of the statute's prose
renders its detailed provisions increasingly irrelevant, while its few
more general provisions are not elastic enough to compensate for
the specific provisions' weaknesses. Although the statute is a relatively young one, its inability to adjust to the changes in the world it
was designed to order has already become manifest. I will review
two of the 1976 Act's most troublesome failures. First, I will illustrate the pitfalls of reliance on too-specific language by examining
the fate of the statute's cable television provision. I will then explore the inadequacy of the law's few general provisions in a discussion of the problems posed by private use.
A.

Cable Television and its Competitors
373
Under the 1976 Act's broad definition of public performance,
any transmission of a radio or television signal is a public performance and can trigger copyright liability unless it comes within a
privilege or license spelled out in the statute. For example, one subsection of the statute privileges the behavior of individuals who
merely turn on a radio or television in a public place; 374 without
that exemption, a clerical worker's use of a transistor radio at the
3 73

See 17 U.S.C. § 101:
To perform or display a work "publicly" means(1) To perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) To transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at
the same time or at different times.
3 74
See id. § 110(5). Subsection 110(5) establishes a conditional privilege for the
"public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes," but prohibits charging anyone to see or hear the transmission or any further transmission of the signal. The statute defines transmission as
communication "by any device or process whereby images are received beyond the
place from which they are sent." Id. § 101.
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office would infringe the copyright owner's exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly." 37' 5
The cable television section includes an exemption for passive
common carriers with "no direct or indirect control over the content or selection of the primary transmission or over recipients of
the secondary transmission, and whose activities with respect to the
secondary transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or
other communications channels for the use of others. ' 376 It includes a complicated group of privileges and compulsory licenses
for some, but by no means all, cable television transmissions.37 7
The complex provisions of the cable section were drawn to accommodate industry practices in the mid-1970s and to incorporate the
substantive regulatory structure that the FCC had put in place,
much of which was integral to the deal. Neither the industry practices of the mid-1970s nor the FCC's regulations, however, survived
very long.
The development of satellite technology soon made satellite
transmission preferable to microwave transmission for delivery of
cable signals. The copyright status of satellites and satellite transmissions, however, was murky. Could a communications satellite
come within the statutory exemption for passive common carriers?
Nobody was sure.3 78 The use of satellite technology spurred the
growth of original cable programming, which offered an attractive
alternative to the importation of distant signals. Pay cable programming companies, such as Home Box Office, began to offer programs directly to cable systems. The FCC imposed stringent
restrictions on pay cable programming, but, in 1977, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck those regulations down.3 79
Shortly thereafter, the FCC decided to re-examine the rest of its
cable television regulations, 3 0 and ultimately dismantled much of
37 5
37 6
37 7

Id. § 106.
Id. § I lI(a)(3).
1Id.

§ I11(c).

378 See 1979 House Hearings,supra note 312, at 23 (prepared statement of Barbara

Ringer, Register of Copyrights). Ultimately, the courts concluded that communications
satellites operating as common carriers were entitled to the passive carrier exemption in
§ II l(a)(3). See Hubbard Broadcasting v. Southern Satellite Systems, 777 F.2d 393
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986); Eastern Microwave v. Doubleday
Sports, 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
379 See Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
3 80
See 1979 House Hearings,supra note 312, at 3 (prepared statement of Henry Geller, U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
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the regulatory structure on which the copyright statute's language
had been based. 38 ' Some of the remaining regulations were later
held unconstitutional by the courts. 38 2 ' The newly established
Copyright Royalty Tribunal attempted to compensate for the
FCC's deregulation with a radical recalibration of compulsory license royalty fees;3 83 copyright owners, broadcasters, and cable operators came running to Congress demanding that it revise the
balance.38 4 Members of Congress again applied pressure to encourage a privately negotiated solution.38 5 Tentative deals emerged
from private negotiations but dissolved before final agreements
could be reached.38 6
At the same time, the playing field grew more crowded. Alternatives to cable television systems sprung up. Apartment complexes
installed Satellite Master Antenna Systems, which combined satellite dishes and conventional antennas to provide a range of programming to residents. The Register of Copyrights concluded that
the application of the compulsory license provision to Satellite
Master Antenna systems was unclear. 38 7

Further complications

arose in 1982 when the FCC authorized low-power television stations.3 8 8 Was a low-power television station located in the same
community as a cable system a "local" station within the meaning
of the statute and thus "entitled to insist upon its signal being retransmitted by a cable system pursuant to the rules, regulations,
and authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission in
effedt on April 15, 1976"?18 9 Alternatively, was the station to be
deemed a "distant" one, and entitled to royalties if the cable system
381 See 1983 Senate Hearings,supra note 313, at 5 (testimony of David Ladd, Register of Copyrights).
382 See Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986).
383 See National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d
176
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
384See Copyright/Cable Television: Hearings on H.R. 1805, H.R. 2007, H.R.
2108,
H.R. 3528, H.R. 3530, H.R. 3560, H.R. 3940, H.R. 5870 and H.R. 5949 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 2 (1982) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
385 See, e.g., id. at 1266-67 (testimony of Thomas Wheeler, Nat'l Cable Television
Ass'n); id. at 1335 (testimony of Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Ass'n of America).
386See, e.g., id. at 1357 (testimony of Vincent T. Wasilewski, Nat'l Ass'n of
Broadcasters).
387 See Copyright and New Technologies, supra note 2, at 53-54
(prepared statement
of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
3 88
See 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468 (1982), on recon., 48 Fed. Reg. 21,478 (1983).
389 17 U.S.C. § Ill(f).
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chose to carry it? Low-power television stations asked the Copyright Office for a ruling on their status; the Copyright Office held a
public hearing on the issue and concluded that the statute was
ambiguous.390
As with the 1909 Act, linguistic fortuity appeared to control the
legal status of developing technology. The increasing use of satellites led to the marketing of the home satellite dish, which enabled
viewers to intercept satellite transmissions without paying a cable
system to deliver them. Was the use of a satellite dish an infringement of copyright? The answer depended in part on whether the
satellite dish could appropriately be characterized as a "single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes." 3'9
In response to home satellite dish purchases, cable programmers began scrambling their signals. Cable services sought to scramble the
broadcast signals they obtained via satellite, but the copyright statute posed a problem. Both the exemptions and the compulsory
licenses in the statute prohibited signal alteration. If the satellite
systems performed either the scrambling or unscrambling themselves, they could no longer claim that they had no control over the
signal's content but merely provided "wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of others."3'92 If a cable system
scrambled or unscrambled the signal itself, it would run afoul of the
statutory provision that prohibited willful alteration of the signal
39 3
"through changes, deletions, or additions.
The essence of the problem for all of the newly developed entertainment technologies was that the 1976 Copyright Act gave
copyright owners a very broad public performance right subject
only to enumerated exceptions. The definition of performance was
designed to encompass future technological developments; the privileges and limitations were not. The legality of a new entertainment
service, therefore, depended entirely upon whether its activities fit
within specifically worded exceptions negotiated without it in
mind. 39 4 This severely disadvantaged newcomers to the market390

See Copyright and New Technologies, supra note 2, at 7-10 (prepared statement of
Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights). In 1986, Congress enacted a narrow amendment
to § I 11, clarifying low-power television's status for the purpose of the cable compulsory license. See Pub. L. No. 99-397 (1986).
391 17 U.S.C. § 110(5). See Entertainment and Sports Programming Network v.
Edinburg Community Hotel, 623 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Copyright and New
Technologies, supra note 2, at 122 (colloquy).
392 17 U.S.C. § II l(a)(3).
39 3

1d.

§ 111(c)(3).

394 See Copyright and New Technologies, supra note 2, at 4 (testimony of Ralph
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place, since, at best, their legal status remained uncertain until Congress or the courts could speak. A new medium's only secure
course was to pursue negotiated licenses with the innumerable
copyright owners whose works appeared in the signals, at prohibitive transaction costs.
I pick on the cable compulsory license provision because it is a
particularly easy target, and because the unsuccessful effort to clarify its ambiguities has occupied Congress throughout the past decade.3 95 The problems with the cable television provisions, however,
are symptomatic of problems that pervade the 1976 Act. Defining
very broad rights subject to very specific exceptions creates a systemic bias: the exceptions will quickly grow obsolete, while the increasingly less qualified rights will endure. The lesson that emerges
from the rapid obsolescence of the cable provisions is that a statute
needs more than a discernible strategy to adjust to technological
39 6
change; it must also incorporate some flexibility.
B.

Private Use

Technological progress has gradually upset the overall balance
that the statute struck when it was enacted by making the law's
specific limitations trivial. The few more elastic limitations have
been insufficiently powerful to restore the law's balance. In the
Oman, Register of Copyrights). In Pacific & Southern Co. v. Satellite Broadcast Networks, for example, the operator of a direct broadcast satellite, which made secondary
transmissions of broadcast programming directly to home satellite dishes, argued that it
was entitled to a cable compulsory license. The court held that defendant could not use
a cable compulsory license because it was not a cable system within the meaning of the
statutory language. "[T]he definition of a cable system ... requires the cable system to
be facility, located in any state, which makes secondary transmissions of signals. SBN's
satellite which orbits the earth is not a facility located in any state." Pacific & Southern
Co. v. Satellite Broadcast Networks, 694 F. Supp. 1565, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
395 Extensive inter-industry negotiations have yielded only partial, piecemeal solutions. In 1988, Congress clarified the rules for a subgroup of satellite systems operators
by adding a complicated new compulsory license to the statute. See Satellite Home
Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 119); Olson, supra note 2, at 121-22; supra note 16.
396 In theory, courts could supply the flexibility that the statute lacks. Courts could
attempt to interpret the 1976 Act in a manner that would give greater flexibility to its
limitations. They could go further and use the statute's specific privileges as bases for
generalization. The ephemeral recording privileges in 17 U.S.C. § 112, for example,
might suggest a more general privilege to make temporary copies (or indeed other incidental use) of a copyrighted work in connection with a use that has already been licensed. Most contemporary courts, however, would view such an undertaking as
within Congress's exclusive preserve.
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years since the statute's enactment, these general doctrines have
themselves come under attack.
In the decade since the 1976 Act took effect, the most vexing
problems posed by new technology have involved new communications media, computer databases and software, and private use.
Other, potentially more serious problems appear on the horizon,
but have yet to manifest themselves in concrete disputes.39 7 I have
already discussed some of the problems posed by new communications media.3 98 Computer software problems 399 have generated an
extensive literature of their own.'
I will not take time here to go
back over that ground, except to note in passing that courts struggling with computer database and software cases have given the
idea/expression distinction short shrift.4 ' I would, however, like
to devote some attention at this point to private use.
397 See generally OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 102-16, 138-54; see also Fleischmann, supra note 3 (problems threatened by digital technology); Kost, supra note 3
(problems threatened by integrated digital network systems); Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of
Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723 (1987).
398 See supra notes 373-95 and accompanying text.
399 In 1980, Congress amended the copyright statute to add provisions to clarify the
scope of copyright in computer programs. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117). These provisions were drafted, not by agreement of
industry representatives, but by a blue ribbon commission appointed by Congress to
formulate solutions to copyright problems posed by technology. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT

(1979). The resulting amendments are widely, if not universally, acknowledged to have
been disastrous. They have failed to meet the legitimate needs of either software proprietors or software users. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 59-85; Derwin &
Siegel, Microcode Copyright Infringement, 4 COMPUTER LAW., April, 1987, at 1;
Haynes & Durant, Patents and Copyrights in Computer Software Based Technology:
Why Bother With Patents?, 4 COMPUTER LAW., Feb., 1984, at 1; Samuelson, supra note
331; sources cited infra note 400. Their most obvious flaw appears to be that the Commission had only superficial understanding of computers and less understanding about
processes of software design and use.
400 See, e.g., Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software and the New Protectionism, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1987); Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987); Nimmer & Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology
Infringement: Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62 IND. L.J. 13 (1986); Oman,
supra note 7; Samuelson, supra note 331; Samuelson, supra note 341; Staines, Idei or
IdedFixe?, 50 MOD. L. REV. 368 (1987); The Future ofSoftware Protection, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 903 (1986); Comment, A Rose by any Other Name: Computer Programs and
the Idea-Expression Distinction, 34 EMORY L.J. 741 (1985).
401 See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); National Business Lists v. Dun & Bradstreet,
552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. III. 1982); Karjala, supra note 400; Reback & Hayes, Copyright
Gone Astray. The Misappropriation Alternative, 3 COMPUTER LAW., April, 1986, at 1;
Staines, supra note 400. The courts have also rejected arguments based on the useful
articles doctrine. See, e.g., Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
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Private use is the unauthorized use of copyrighted works by individuals in private, at home or otherwise." °2 The 1976 Act accords
no exclusive rights in private performances or displays. Singing in
the shower is not yet copyright infringement. The statute does,
however, give exclusive reproduction and adaptation rights and exclusive distribution rights qualified by the first sale doctrine.4" 3 The
Act includes no broad private use exception; unauthorized private
copying and adaptation, and private distribution of unauthorized
copies of a work, infringe the work's copyright except to the extent
that they come within a statutory exception, express or implied.
The copyright owners' exclusive rights with respect to private use,
however, have been essentially unenforceable.
As recently as 1965, when the revision bill emerged from the conferences, the unenforceability of rights against private use may not
have been the source of much concern. The economic impact of
private use seemed insignificant. Institutional photocopying appeared to dwarf aggregate individual copying; photocopy machines
were, after all, not cheap. Record pirates selling bootlegged records
seemed a greater threat than the throng of teenagers taping music
from the radio. Videocassette recorders had yet to be marketed as a
consumer product; home computers had not been invented.
Times change. Markets developed that made all sorts of copyrighted works available to consumers in their homes.'
Technology made copying cheap and convenient."
Instead of going to the
movies, a family might subscribe to a movie channel on cable television. Instead of watching the transmission, it could program its
videocassette recorder to record the film; when it finished watching
it, the family could trade the videotape to friends for another. Instead of purchasing software, a computer user could use a modem
to download programs from computer bulletin boards through the
1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). See generally Samuelson, supra note 331, at 741-49.
402 The OTA Report defines private use as "the unauthorized, uncompensated, noncommercial and noncompetitive use of a copyrighted work by an individual who is a
purchaser or user of that work." OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 194. I have not
adopted the OTA definition because it evades controversial questions about the commercial or competitive nature of private use by excluding commercial or competitive use
from the term it defines.
403 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109.
404 See OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 105-11, 194-95; Copyright and Technological
Change, supra note 2, at 79-84 (testimony of Frederick Weingarten, Office of Technology Assessment).
405 See OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 99-103.
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telephone lines. Computer hackers could make cheap, easy copies
of their programs on diskettes and trade them with their colleagues.
By the time Congress enacted the 1976 Act, the contours of the
economic threat posed by private use had begun to emerge. Copyright owners began to worry about enforcing the hitherto unenforceable rights over private use that the 1976 Act appeared to give
them.
Less than a month after Congress passed the 1976 Act, two motion picture studios filed an infringement action against the manufacturer, distributors, retailers, and a user of the Sony Betamax
videocassette recorder. 4° 6 The suit posed the following problem for
the courts: the language of the 1976 Act discouraged the courts
from discovering implied privileges, by couching its multiplicity of
express privileges in such specificity and detail. A conclusion that
the 1976 Act ruled out implied exemptions and privileges, however,
compelled the conclusion that the statute also prohibited any unauthorized copying or adaptation unless it fit within an express exemption. Or unless an express exemption could be stretched to
encompass it.
In Sony, the Supreme Court responded to the problem by stretching fair use. Influenced, perhaps, by the copious references to nonprofit education in the legislative history, the Court established a
presumption that all unauthorized noncommercial use was fair.
Conversely, all unauthorized commercial use would be presumptively infringing.4 °7 This reformulation permitted the Court to hold
that the sale and use of videocassette recorders did not infringe the
rights of copyright owners. It also introduced distortions and rigidity into the fair use doctrine. 4 8 The most troubling aspect of the
reformulation for copyright owners is that it makes most private use
of copyrighted works presumptively fair.4 "9 The reformulation's
most troubling aspect for users of developing technology is that it
makes fair use, a doctrine developed in the context of unauthorized
commercial use of copyrighted works, presumptively unavailable
for any commercial endeavor.4 '
406 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See
Lardner, Annals of Law: The Betamax Case-], NEW YORKER, Apr. 6, 1987, at 45, 50.
40 7
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
408 See Litman, supra note 15, at 897-99.
409 See, e.g., Adelstein & Perez, supra note 223 (arguing for restriction of fair use
privilege); Fleischmann, supra note 7 (arguing for repeal of fair use).
410 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985);
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The Court's twin presumptions have drawn widespread criticism."' Participants in the revision effort agree that the Court's
interpretation turned fair use on its head. The statute's structure,
however, presented the Court with an intolerable dilemma. Consumer videocassette recorders did not yet exist at the time the statutory language was drafted. The consumers who owned and used
videocassette recorders could hardly have participated in the drafting process. The legislative record indicated that the generic problem of private copying, as distinguished from copying by libraries
and schools, had received little attention during the drafting process. But the negotiated deals embodied in the statutory language
called for imposing liability on millions of users of videocassette recorders. Such a result seemed intolerable; indeed, even the plaintiffs in the lawsuit declined to seek it. 4 12 Instead, the plaintiffs

sought to enjoin the sale of a machine that permitted individual
users to record copyrighted works, something that the legislative
record indicated had never even been mentioned during the revision
effort. The only palatable result seemed to require privileging the
use, but the statute offered no reasonable route to that destination.
Faced with a single flexible limitation that could conceivably apply,
the Court used it.
The result of the dilemma was to stretch fair use until it lost its
flexibility. Commercial actors-authors, news reporters, legal
database publishers, and parodists-now face a copyright statute
whose fair use privilege is, absent disingenuous inventions by the
lower courts,4 13 presumptively unavailable.4 14 Copyright owners,
who find that their works are increasingly being delivered to and
West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1070 (1987); Bourne Co. v. Speeks, 670 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1987).
411 See, e.g., Adelstein & Perez, supra note 223; Oman, supra note 223, at 32; The
Supreme Court, 1984 Term: Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 299 (1985); Note,
When "Fairis Foul . A Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 218 (1986).
412 See Lardner, supra note 406, at 48-50.
413 See Litman, supra note 15, at 899; infra note 438 and accompanying text.
414 See, e.g., United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publishing, 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir.
1988); Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031
(N.D. Ga. 1986); Lakedale Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 230 U.S.P.Q.
694 (D. Minn. 1986). Both presumptions may be rebutted with evidence as to a particular use's actual and potential effect on the market for the copyrighted work. The burden
of proof on rebuttal has proved heavy as a practical matter, and conclusions about
market effect are invariably circular. See, e.g., Clemmons, Author v. Parodist: Striking
a Compromise, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 8 (1985).
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used by individuals in their homes,4 1 5 face a copyright statute that
presumptively privileges many unauthorized uses. Unauthorized
reception of satellite signals for home television viewing, unauthorized home taping of copyrighted music and films, and unauthorized
adaptation or copying of computer programs on floppy disks seem
potentially within the new fair use privilege.4 16 In the aggregate,
the economic impact of these uses is substantial, and copyright proprietors would prefer that they be viewed as consumer theft. But
much of the pain that friends of copyright insist they feel over Sony
is self-inflicted. Representatives of copyright owners resisted the incorporation of broad privileges into the revision bill throughout the
revision process. The courts turned to fair use because the statute
left them no alternative; a statute that incorporated more general,
flexible limitations might have weathered Sony with significantly
less damage.4 17 The application of a statute granting broad rights
with narrow exceptions to new technology forces courts to reach
peculiar results.
Although copyright owners lost a significant battle in court, they
did not abandon the fight to assert the rights they believed they had
bargained for in the 1976 Act. They have continued to insist that
the 1976 Act gives them the right, albeit unenforceable, to prohibit
private use and have campaigned to close the statutory loopholes
that permit the widespread unauthorized use of their works by individuals in private. Even while Sony was pending, representatives of
copyright owners peppered Congress with legislative proposals. Efforts to prohibit private use by millions of consumers directly, they
recognized, would be politically unpopular and impossible to enact.
Instead, copyright owners proposed indirect methods, beginning
4 18
with an assault on the first sale doctrine.
The immediate targets of the audio and video first sale bills were
4 15

See OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 193-95.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 257, at 595.
417 A statutory privilege to make temporary incidental copies similar to the privilege
described supra note 393, for example, would have permitted timeshifting of television
programs but would not have privileged many of the multiplicity of private uses that
seem to come within the Sony formulation.
418 See Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029, and
S 32 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice,
98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1985). The effort began as a proposal by industry representatives to amend the definition of public performance to encompass rental of copyrighted
works. The Copyright Office responded to a request to draft such a bill by suggesting
that a more appropriate tactic would be to revise the first sale doctrine. See id. at 378
(testimony of Dorothy Schrader, General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office).
416
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businesses that rented videocassette tapes or phonograph records
for profit. The proposed legislation modified the first sale doctrine
by prohibiting owners of copies of audiovisual works4 19 or phonorecords42 ° from renting, leasing, or lending them for commercial
advantage. After negotiations between representatives of copyright
owners and representatives of educational institutions yielded language removing educators' objections by exempting nonprofit libraries and educational institutions completely, 4 2' Congress enacted
the Record Rental Amendment, prohibiting the commercial rental
of phonorecords.4 22 The video first sale bill stalled, as did424a com4 23
puter software first sale bill drafted in similar language.
Another phase of the effort attacked the home copying problem
through the manufacturers of copying equipment. One sort of proposal would have required manufacturers to install devices in retail
419 See H.R. 1029, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
4 20
See H.R. 1027, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
421 See Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, supra note 418, at 338-41 (testimony of
August Steinhilber, Chairman of Educators' Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law).
422 Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b),
115(c)(3)). The law, as amended in 1988, has a 13 year sunset provision. See Pub. L.
No. 100-617, 102 Stat. 3194 (1988). Evidence of the commercial rental of phonorecords
to facilitate unauthorized private copying assisted copyright owners in securing the Record Rental Amendment. See Home Audio Recording Act, supra note 2, at 28 (testimony
of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights). Although copyright owners have offered similar evidence about the rental of videocassettes, see, e.g., Home Video Recording, supra
note 2, at 2-32 (testimony of Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am.), they have not
been successful in securing an amendment to prohibit videocassette rental.
423 See S. 3074, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The software first sale bill has been
reintroduced in successive sessions of Congress. See S. 198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); S.2727, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 1743, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
424 In another ring of the circus, proprietors of copyright in computer software
mounted another assault on the first sale doctrine. In 1980, Congress amended the
statute to clarify the scope of copyright in computer software and included a sui generis
first sale doctrine for computer programs. The provision gave owners of copies of computer programs the privilege to make backup copies and limited adaptations of the programs, on the condition that when the owner sold, leased, or otherwise transferred her
copy of the program, she destroy any adapted copy and either destroy any backup copies or transfer them along with the original copy. 17 U.S.C. § 117. In order to defeat
the privilege, which was limited in terms to "owners" of copies of programs, software
manufacturers purported to stop selling computer software. They devised a "shrinkwrap license" that advised purchasers of off-the-shelf software that the transaction
whereby they paid money in return for a copy of a computer program was not a "sale"
at all, but rather a "license." The terms of the license, which the would-be purchaser
was deemed to accept upon opening the cellophane shrink-wrap, provided that the
software manufacturer retained ownership of the copy of the software, and, typically,
restricted the licensee's use, copying, adaptation, and transfer of the copy much more
narrowly than the statute restricted owners. See generally Samuelson, supra note 341.
See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding shrinkwrap license unenforceable).
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audiotape and videocassette recorders that prevented unauthorized
copying.12' A second variety of bill would have imposed a
surcharge on recording equipment and blank tape, to be distributed
as a royalty fund for home taping.42 6 Neither approach has acquired the consensus required for enactment.
Copyright owners have gradually realized that the unenforceability of the rights they claim in private uses is itself a threat, because
it breeds disrespect for copyright among potential infringers and
clouds the marketplace with confusion. 427 They have not, however,
been able either to resolve their differences with opponents of private use legislation or to abandon the fight.42 8
Hearings on these proposals have consumed a lot of congressional time, as have hearings on other private use issues. The Copyright Office has for several years suggested that Congress must
429
make a policy determination on the treatment of private use.
Legal academics and the Office of Technology Assessment have endorsed the recommendation.4 30 Representatives of affected interests
insist that Congress made that policy determination when it enacted
the 1976 Act, although the witnesses disagree about what Congress
determined. Those who represent motion picture producers and
record companies, for example, insist that the 1976 Act gives them
the exclusive right of reproduction, including private reproduction
in the home.43 1 Those who represent manufacturers and retailers of
425 See Copyright Issues Presented by Digital Audio Tape, supra note 2; Home Video
Recording, supra note 2, at 2-50 (various witnesses).
426 See Home Audio Recording Act, supra note 2; Video and Audio Home Taping:
Hearing on S, 31 and S. 175 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
427 See, e.g., Copyright and Technological Change, supra note 2, at 267-80 (materials
from Feb., 1984 Congressional Copyright and Technology Symposium in Fort Lauderdale, FL).
428 See, e.g., Home Video Recording, supra note 2, at 77 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
429 See, e.g., Copyright and New Technologies, supra note 2, at 11-13 (prepared statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights); Copyright Issues Presented by Digital
Audio Tape, supra note 2, at 142-44 (testimony of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights); Home Audio Recording Act, supra note 2, at 85 (testimony of Ralph Oman,
Register of Copyrights); Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, supra note 418, at 379-80
(testimony of Dorothy Schrader, General Counsel, Copyright Office); Video and Audio
Home Taping, supra note 426, at 51 (testimony of David Ladd, Register of Copyrights).
430 See OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 288-90; see, e.g., Home Audio Recording Act,
supra note 2, at 952-55 (written comments of Prof. Paul Goldstein, Stanford Law
School); Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearings on S. 1758
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 20-25 (1982)
(testimony of Prof. Leon Friedman, Hofstra Law School).
431 See, e.g., Home Video Recording, supra note 2, at 3 (testimony of Jack Valenti,
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audio and video tape recorders, in contrast, claim that the 1976 Act
establishes the public's right to make home recordings.4 3 2 Representatives of both interests, however, agree that Congress settled the
issue in 1976. Perhaps members of Congress have found this testimony of industry representatives persuasive. They have, in any
event, demonstrated little eagerness for grappling with the general
problems that private use poses. If the history of copyright revision
is a guide, we should not expect answers to be forthcoming any time
soon: the problems of private use do not seem amenable to negotiated solution.
VI
NEGOTIATED STATUTES AND TECHNOLOGICAL

POLICY

Not all of the suggested amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act
have been of the close-the-loophole variety. Many others have been
more in the nature of widen-the-loophole bills. 433 Bills of both
types have mired Congress in more minutia than did the twenty-one
year revision effort that culminated in the 1976 Act. Meanwhile,
the 1976 Act's few general limitations have suffered serious erosion.
Ten years after the effective date of the Act, the idea/expression
distinction has received progressively more narrow construction
from the courts.43 4 Fewer aspects of copyrighted works are held
unprotected facts and ideas. More courts are conferring broad
copyright protection on works that are primarily factual;4 35 more
Motion Picture Ass'n of America); Audio and Video FirstSale Doctrine, supra note 418,
at 4 (testimony of Stanley Gortikov, Recording Industry Ass'n of America).
432 See, e.g., Home Video Recording, supra note 2, at 84-94 (prepared statement of
Charlie Ferris, Home Recording Rights Coalition).
433 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 97-366, § 3, 96 Stat. 1759 (1982) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(10)) (establishing exemption for performances by veterans and fraternal organizations); S. 2881, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988) (bill to create exemption for public performance of videotapes in hospitals and nursing homes); S. 1980, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (bill to restrict right of public performance in musical works used in syndicated
television programs); S. 1734, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (bill to remove various restrictions and annual royalty payments from jukebox compulsory license); S. 175, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess (1983) (bill to create exemption for noncommercial videotaping of any
copyrighted work); H.R. 8098, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) (bill to expand exemption
for transmissions of performances of literary works to blind and handicapped
audiences).
434 See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 400.
435 See, e.g., National Business Lists v. Dun & Bradstreet, 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
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courts are protecting systems and methods of operation.43 6 The
useful articles doctrine remains limited to buildings, bicycle racks,
clothing, clothing mannequins, and articles of the same sort.4 3 7
Fair use remains presumptively unavailable to commercial endeavors, although courts have found the twin presumptions so unworkable that they have begun crafting ways to sidestep them.4 38 The
modified first sale doctrine has become increasingly irrelevant as
greater proportions of copyrighted works are disseminated to the
4 39
public by methods that involve no purchase of tangible copies.
Interests that were involved in the drafting process have been insulated from this erosion, because they received the benefit of specifically tailored privileges. THe narrowness of those privileges,
however, has caused them to age rapidly. Although the interests
that participated in the legislative process have fared better under
the statute than some of their upstart competitors who did not, the
aging of the narrow privileges may have brought home to some of
them that drafting a statute with too few exceptions to balance the
breadth of the rights it confers may not have been in their long term
best interests. Or perhaps not. If such a realization is indeed dawning, industry representatives have yet to translate it into action.
Representatives of affected industries have inundated Congress
with narrow legislative proposals to respond to technological
change. Some members of Congress have recently expressed almost
unprecedented 44 interest in considering such bills within the context of the larger picture. Representative Kastenmeier, who has
chaired the House Subcommittee responsible for copyright legislation since 1966, has called hearings on the general issue of copyright
and technological change, and held a symposium for the general
436See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1031 (1987).
437 See, e.g., E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 (D.
Minn. 1985). See generally Brown, supra note 257, at 600-06.
438See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986);
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry
Holt and Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), ajf'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1989); Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987).
439 See OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 206-08.
440 Most copyright hearings during the past century have focused on particular
problems or on pending legislation. In 1932, however, Rep. Sirovich scheduled general
hearings on copyright matters with a view to educating fellow committee members on
copyright issues as a prelude to the introduction of any legislation. See supra note 120
and accompanying text.
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education of subcommittee members."' The House and Senate Judiciary Committees commissioned a report from the Office of Technology Assessment to examine the pressures of technological
development on copyright law." 2 The House Subcommittee has
listened to far ranging and even radical proposals, 4 3 proposals that
have gone largely unnoticed in academic legal scholarship. Both
House and Senate Subcommittees, however, have retained their
commitment to negotiated solutions. The course of recent negotiations among affected interests reveals little possibility of a consensus
on any major proposal.
Suggestions for radical re-examination of Congress's approach to
copyright law have inspired little enthusiasm among industry representatives. The Office of Technology Assessment floated a proposal
for complete restructuring of the copyright law.'
Industry representatives responded to the proposal with distrust." 5 One witness
recommended replacing the current copyright statute with an administrative agency charged with responding to technological development with substantive regulations; 446 the proposal received no
441 See Copyright and Technological Change, supra note 2.
442 OTA REPORT, supra note 3. See generally OTA Report on Intellectual Property
Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information, supra note 2.
443 See, e.g., Copyright and Technological Change, supra note 2, at 29-55 (testimony
of Joseph Coates, J.F. Coates, Inc.) (suggesting, inter alia, removing copyright jurisdiction from courts); id. at 129-38 (prepared statement of Richard Stern, Washington,
D.C.) (suggesting variety of intellectual property systems tailored to particular technologies); CRT Reform and Compulsory Licenses: Hearingson H.R. 2752 and H.R. 2784
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 206-44 (1986) (testimony of Daniel
W. Toohey, Dow, Lohnes & Albertson) (suggesting federal copyright regulatory
agency).
44 The OTA Report is a brilliant critique of current law and policy and has been
controversial among those who have reviewed it. The Report's major thrust is that
recent technological developments are having a profound effect on intellectual property
law, and have rendered many of the assumptions on which the law is based obsolete. See
OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-15, 31. The Report suggests several possible approaches to reform. One of the Report's most provocative proposals calls for a wholesale revision of the copyright law that would set forth different rules for protection of
works of art, works of fact and works of function.
445 See Garcia, The OTA Report on Intellectual Property Rights, Network Planning
Paper No. 16, supra note 3, at 9, 11-12; see, e.g., Baumgarten & Meyer, supra note 4.
446 See CR T Reform and Compulsory Licenses, supra note 443, at 206-44 (testimony
of Daniel Toohey, Dow, Lohnes & Albertson); see also OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at
282 (suggesting federal intellectual property agency). The few witnesses and the occasional commentator, see, e.g., Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47
U. PiTr. L. REV. 1229, 1262-67 (1986), who support the idea of a federal copyright
agency cite the speed with which it could respond to problems posed by technological
change as its most attractive feature, Mr. Toohey, the attorney who testified in favor of
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support." 7 Every proposal to change the status quo has received
opposition from some camp on the ground that it would remove a
perceived advantage enjoyed under current law."'
Members of Congress have continued to encourage negotiated solutions. 44 9 Interested parties meet with each other but cling to provincial negotiating postures. Current stakeholders are unwilling to
part with short term statutory benefits in the service of long term
legal stability. 45 ° Those disfranchised by current law lack the bargaining chips to trade for concessions. Thus, the process is unlikely
to produce any legislative proposals that would reduce the imbalance in the current act.
Furthermore, the process is securely entrenched. The inquiry relevant to copyright legislation long ago ceased to be "is this a good
bill?" Rather, the inquiry has been, and continues to be "is this a
bill that current stakeholders agree on?" The two questions are not
the same.
Negotiations among current stakeholders tend to produce laws
that resolve existing inter-industry disputes with detailed and specific statutory language, which rapidly grows obsolete. Such laws
consign the disputes of the future to resolution under models biased
in favor of the status quo. 451 A copyright law cannot make sensible
such an approach, seems especially impressed with an agency's ability to craft narrow
solutions to narrow problems. See Toohey, supra note 7, at 568. Giving responsibility
for formulating substantive copyright law to a federal administrative agency would require abandoning a longstanding tradition, animated largely by first amendment concerns, of distrust for such a solution. The Copyright Office, for example, is not viewed
as administrative agency and has no adjudicatory and only very limited rulemaking
authority. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, in contrast, is an agency but its jurisdiction
is limited to the setting of rates and division of fees for compulsory licenses. Concerns
about issues such as capture loom large when one is considering entrusting to the government the authority for regulating a wide variety of expression protected by the first
amendment. The FCC's performance in this regard has not been reassuring.
447 See, e.g., CRT Reform and Compulsory Licenses, supra note 443, at 74 (testimony
of Irwin Karp, Authors' League of America); id. at 153 (testimony of Prof. Paul Goldstein, Stanford Law School).
448 See, e.g., id. at 491-93 (testimony of Stephen R. Effros, President, Community
Antenna Television Ass'n, Inc.).
449 See, e.g., id. at 259-61 (colloquy); Copyright and Technological Change, supra note
2, at 27 (remarks of Rep. Sawyer); Home Video Recording, supra note 2, at 77 (remarks
of Sen. Thurmond).
450 See, e.g., US. Adherence to the Berne Convention, supra note 16, at 212 (prepared
statement of Carol Risher, Ass'n of American Publishers); id. at 388 (testimony of
Elroy Wolff, Amusement & Music Operators Ass'n).
451 Fledgling technologies faced with uncertainty about their status under copyright
law encounter barriers to doing business and difficulty securing funding. See, e.g., Oversight of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Cable Television): Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
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provision for the growth of technology unless it incorporates both
the flexibility to make adjustments and the general principles to
guide courts in the directions those adjustments should take. The
negotiation process that has dominated copyright revision throughout this century, however, is ill-adapted to generate that flexibility.
It cannot, therefore, be expected to produce statutes that improve
with age.
CONCLUSION

I have thus far criticized the pitfalls of a legislative process that
relies heavily on negotiations among affected interests without acknowledging its strengths. Although I believe that the process's advantages are outweighed by its disadvantages, those strengths are
not trivial. Indeed, this legislative process continues to outlive the
legislation that it has produced because its advantages are
significant.
The process brings together the real copyright experts, and allows
Congress to exploit their accumulated expertise. The participants
are the people who will have to order their day-to-day business relations with one another around the provisions of the legislation.
They can bring their perspective on the real world in which they
interact to bear on the law with which they will have to live.
The process permits a give and take among a wide field of players
whose competing interests are exceedingly complex. The universe
of current stakeholders does not divide easily into monolithic
camps.4 5 2 There may be no simple, overarching principles that can
on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-33 (1981) (testimony of Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights). Users of new technology confront formidable obstacles to
their efforts to exploit the new products or services within the confines of a cloudy
copyright law. See, e.g., Kost, supra note 3, at 23-24. A law whose application to new
technology depends on linguistic fortuity will, at best, distort technological policy in a
haphazard fashion. At worst, it will skew technological policy in favor of current stakeholders and away from technological development.
452 It may once have been possible to talk about interests affected by copyright as if
some were creators of copyrighted works and others were users of copyrighted works.
By the turn of the twentieth century, that dichotomy was too simple to describe the
array of players in the game. It is now a nearly meaningless distinction. Composers
compose music, but the music uses sounds that they have heard in other music. Directors make movies, but much of what they do comes down to choosing what aspects of
other people's work to incorporate into their films. Television networks assemble a
combination of independently-produced and in-house programs to create a broadcast
day. Network affiliates choose from items available on the network feed and programming syndicated by other sources to create their own compilations of programs. Cable
systems select among available broadcast and non-broadcast programming to assemble
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easily define how all of these actors should order their interactions
with one another. Putting all of them into a room and asking them
not to come out until they have agreed to be bound by the same
rules may be the most efficient approach to formulating law that
will work well enough for each of them.
The process also makes copyright revision politically feasible. If
one could overcome the difficulties in educating members of Congress in a technical legal field with little publicity value, and find
ways to impart enough knowledge about the complex inner workings of the myriad affected industries, one would still face daunting
obstacles to coming up with enactable legislation. Every adjustment to the copyright statute will disadvantage some current stakeholder, who will be someone's constituent. Perhaps a statute might
be enacted over that stakeholder's pitched opposition; but efforts to
accomplish that in the past have not succeeded. If the stakeholder
will instead agree to accept the disadvantage in return for an advantage conceded by another stakeholder, there will be no pitched opposition and the bill will be much more likely to go through.
The need to balance concessions in order to achieve such agreement, of course, imposes constraints on the sort of legislation that is
likely to emerge from the process. Unless the participants become
convinced that the new legislation gives them no fewer benefits than
they currently enjoy, they are likely to press for additional concessions. It must, therefore, be expected that any successful copyright
legislation will confer advantages on many of the interests involved
in hammering it out, and that those advantages will probably come
at some absent party's expense. But nobody need take the responsibility for making difficult political choices associated with selecting
the interests that the legislation will disadvantage. Indeed, the process is almost tailor-made to select those interests thoughtlessly and
automatically, as a byproduct of ongoing negotiations.
It is the seeming inevitability of bias against absent interests, and
of narrow compromises with no durability, that makes such a process so costly. Each time we rely on current stakeholders to agree
on a statutory scheme, they produce a scheme designed to protect
themselves against the rest of us. Its rigidity leads to its breakdown;
the statute's drafters have incorporated too few general principles to
guide courts in effecting repairs.
Reliance on the real copyright experts has led to Congress's enan anthology of signals for subscribers. The copyright law defines authorship broadly
enough to include all of these activities within its purview.

HeinOnline -- 68 Or. L. Rev. 359 1989

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68, 1989]

actment of laws that few of its members understand.4 5 3 Nobody
would quarrel with the statement that political expediency sometimes causes Congress to enact legislation its members have not
thought through. The entrenched nature of the process for developing copyright legislation, however, works to foreclose any possibility that Congress will enact copyright laws that its members have
framed, or at least comprehend.
It would seem naive to suggest that Congress simply reclaim its
legislative responsibilities and write a revised copyright statute embodying general principles instead of negotiated deals. Current
stakeholders have controlled the playing board for more than eight
decades, and would doubtless prefer to keep it that way. Although
they squabble with one another over specifics, they have managed to
unite in fierce opposition to copyright revision bills drafted without
their participation.4 54 They are unlikely to support a movement to
divest them of responsibility for drafting copyright legislation.4 55
But perhaps the current stakeholders would be receptive to a cautionary note. Those involved in the process of copyright legislation
complain about widespread disregard of the copyright law enacted
in 1976.456 Copyright owners bemoan unenforceable statutory
rights.4 57 Participants and commentators complain that courts misinterpret the bargains embodied in the statute.45 8 It is hardly surprising, however, that a statute too long, complex, and technical for
453 See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings,supra note 204, at 1285-95 (various witnesses); id.
at 1358-60 (colloquy); id. at 1578 (remarks of Rep. Pattison); id. at 1713-14 (colloquy);
id. at 1748-49 (colloquy); id. at 1753 (colloquy); 122 CONG. REC. 31,985-86 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 43 CONG. REC. 3853-54 (1909). See generally Litman, supra
note 15, at 865-82.
454 See supra notes 119-30, 197-200 and accompanying text.
455 In any event, such a movement is unlikely to arise. The public has become increasingly cynical about the legislative process. Highly publicized criticisms in recent
years have inured most constituents to the fact that the way Congress actually goes
about its job diverges sharply from the model presented in high school civics courses.
456 See, e.g., Home Video Recording, supra note 2, at 3-52 (testimony of Jack Valenti,
Motion Picture Ass'n of America).
457 See, e.g., Copyright and Technological Change, supra note 2, at 271, 280 (Congressional Copyright And Technology Symposium, Panel on the Administration of Rights
in Copyrighted Works in the New Technologies).
458 See, e.g., Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Copyright Laws: Hearingson the
Authority and Responsibility of the Federal Government to Protect Intellectual Property
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-95 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, former Register
of Copyrights); Abrams, Who's Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative
Works Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985); Adelstein & Perez, supra note 223, at
228-33; Karp, Reflections on the Copyright Revision Act, 34 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
53, 61-68 (1986); Litman, supra note 15, at 896-903; Oman, supra note 223, at 32, 35-37.
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members of the Congress that enacted it to understand confounds
the courts. It is even less surprising that members of the public will
behave in accord with their sense of what the rules ought to be in
preference to deciphering an entire volume of the United States
Code. If the private parties who negotiate copyright legislation
among themselves cannot come up with bills that look as if they
were drafted by members of Congress to embody general principles
rather than like a web of interdependent bilateral and trilateral
deals, the bills they do come up with are unlikely to work very well
in practice. Technology will develop, and statutory provisions will
grow obsolete with breathtaking speed.
Current stakeholders may prefer today's world or, indeed yesterday's world, to tomorrow's. They may, understandably, prefer a
copyright law that forces tomorrow's players to order their business
by today's rules. They may even be the beneficiaries of a legislative
process that allows them to create a copyright law that meets that
specification. They cannot, however, force time to stop. Representatives of affected interests insist that they want a workable copyright law. They could use the familiar process to produce one.
They need only do what Congress seems to be unable to do for
them: draft a law that balances elastic rights with comparably elastic, flexible limitations.
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